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Archeological Resource Preservation: The Role of
State and Local Government
Ronald H. Rosenberg*
Americans have begun to rediscover their cultural history. In
an effort to define a national identity and chart a future course,
the nation is looking to its past. In many parts of the country,
there is evidence that individuals and governments are becoming
aware of the value of preserving cultural resources. That movement has been reflected primarily in the upsurge of interest in preserving buildings or districts of historical value. 1 Historical preservation has also become a technique for redevelopment of many
declining urban districts throughout the nation. 2 While there may
be various reasons for the increased enthusiasm for historical preservation within the urban context, it is apparent that society has
recognized that certain places and structures are imbued with a
cultural value connecting the present with the past. That recognition illustrates a social awareness of the benefit in protecting culturally important sites and objects.3
Historically or architecturally significant buildings, however,
are only one familiar example of a cultural resource. More broadly
defined as "physical features, both natural and man-made, associated with human activity [and] possessing significance . . . in his* Associate Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, Williamsburg, Virginia.
1. Judicial support for historical preservation can be seen in cases such as Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the United States Supreme
Court approved local government efforts to preserve historically significant buildings. In
Penn Central, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law against a claim made by the owners of the Grand Central Station that the city
law effected an unconstitutional "taking" of their property for public use. I d. at 122, 138. A
secondary issue, not addressed in the majority opinion, was whether the transfer of development rights could be "just compensation" in the event an unconstitutional "taking" was
found. See id. at 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. See generally ADVISORY CouNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE CoNTRIBUTION OF
HISTORIC PRESERVATION TO URBAN REVITALIZATION (1979).
3. In Penn Central, the United States Supreme Court recognized that landmark preservation ordinances were "expected to produce a widespread public benefit" and further
noted that the destruction of an historical landmark like Grand Central Station could be
harmful to society. Arguments to the contrary ignored "the development in sensibilities and
ideals reflected in landmark legislation like New York City's." 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
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tory, architecture, archeology, or human development,"" the term
"cultural resources" also encompasses archeological resources, that
is, physical sites of prior human habitation and material objects or
artifacts associated with the sites. G Archeological resources frequently provide the only material link with past civilizations that
left no written record of their existence. In addition, they provide
insights into and information about past civilizations that are necessary for solving modern-day problems. Recognizing the intangible and irreplaceable value of archeological resources, American society has sought to identify and protect them through varied
legislative and administrative actions for nearly 100 years. 6
Today, archeological resources7 are vulnerable to damage or
obliteration by a number of forces; some of those forces are subject
to governmental control, and some are not. Archeological sites and
artifacts can be easily damaged by public or private land development or construction. A number of statutory provisions require
that advance planning include consideration of the effect federal
4. Fowler, Protection of the Cultural Environment in Federal Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1467-68 (1974).
5. From the perspective of the archeologist, physical sites and artifacts are interrelated
sources of information about prior human experiences. The location of an artifact at the
archeological site can be of major importance in understanding earlier social patterns. To
preserve that unique cultural data, archeological resources must be viewed as an integrated
whole.
6. In 1889, Congress appropriated funds to protect and repair the Casa Grande ruin in
Arizona and to permit the President to reserve the land from settlement and sale. See Act
of March 2, 1889, ch. 411, 25 Stat. 939, 961. That provision alloted only two thousand dollars for the project, a relatively insignificant portion of the Interior Department's appropriation. In 1892, President Benjamin Harrison formally reserved the ruin and 480 acres around
it. See Proclamation of Dec. 10, 1909, 36 Stat. 2504. However, the legal description of the
protected federal land was erroneous, and President William H. Taft had to correct it by
presidential proclamation in 1909. See id. President Woodrow Wilson officially establi11hed
the Casa Grande ruin as a national monument under the authority of the Antiquities Act.
See Proclamation of Aug. 3, 1918, 40 Stat. 1818. Federal involvement in the protection of
archeological resources has continued from that early time. See Historic Sites, Buildings arid
Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976); Archeological and Historic Preservation Act,
id. §§ 469-469c; Reservoir Salvage Act, id.j Archeological Resources Protection Act, id. §§
470aa-47011 (Supp. III 1979); National Environmental Policy Act, id. § 470f (1976); Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976); Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 Fed. Reg.
8921, reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app., at 429 (1976) (calling for cooperation of federal and
state agencies in identifying and preserving historical and cultural structures and sites); Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Procedures, 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.1-.15 (1980); Council
on Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1.6 (1981) (implementing the National Environmental Policy Act).
7. The recently enacted Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) provides a
statutory definition of archeological resources that focuses primarily on artifacts or material
remains rather than the site itself. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1976).
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activities will have on those cultural resources.8 Those specialized
review statutes have done much to make federal agencies aware of
the need to plan projects and programs in a way that minimizes
adverse effects on archeological resources. In addition, they have
provided a reviewable legal standard for agency performance. Similar state and local requirements have also been imposed to regulate potentially destructive activities on nonfederal lands. 9 Thus,
the legal system has been structured to protect archeological resources from damaging governmental acts in much the same fashion as it has protected environmental interests.
Because many archeological resources are considered highly
valuable art objects, there is an additional threat to their existence
and to the physical integrity of the site from which they are taken.
With the value of artifacts on the domestic and international art
markets rapidly escalating, commercially motivated looters have
stepped up their destructive activities on both public and private
lands. 10 In addition, private collectors have enhanced their collections at the expense of the general public by illegally taking artifacts from public lands. Vandals, as always, have done their damage through senseless and wanton destruction. That looting and
vandalism has resulted not only in the loss of valuable objects,11
8. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
9. See notes 115-125 infra and accompanying text.
10. For example, artifacts taken by looters from a site in the Gila National Forest in
southwestern New Mexico were valued at $4000. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 943
(lOth Cir. 1979). See Hearings on S. 490, Archeological Resources Protection Act, Before
the Subcomm. on Parks, Recreation and Renewable Resources of the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (statement of Professor Raymond H. Thompson that a single pot could command
a price between $10,000 and $30,000). In a recent case, three men pled guilty to charges that
they had violated the ARPA by stealing $6,000 to $8,000 worth of clay pots, bone awls,
human skeletal remains and other artifacts from prehistoric Indian ruins in the Tonto National Forest in Arizona. See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1980, at 6, cols. 4-5 (city ed.).
11. Because valuable artifacts are usually buried under the surface of the land, traditional property law has regarded them as belonging to the owner of the locus in quo. See R.
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 26 (3d ed. 1975). See also Goddard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 52
N.W. 1124 (1892); Alfred v. Biegel, 240 Mo. App. 818, 219 S.W.2d 665 (1949). That has been
the position consistently taken by Congress and federal land management agencies where
discoveries have been made on federal land. As the owner of the locus in quo and as the
sovereign, the federal government has claimed comprehensive rights to property under its
control. In California v. Mead, 618 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit held that a
large meteorite discovered on federal land in the Old Woman Mountain Range in California
could be removed and studied by the Smithsonian Institution under a permit issued by the
Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
The court added: "[W]e interpret the Act and its legislative history to give the Secretary of
Interior broad discretionary power to dispose of objects of antiquity found on federal land
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but in the destruction of scientific information about prior societies. Although governments may directly control their own actions
or those of regulated private interests,12 they can only deter private
individuals' illicit activities indirectly through the vigorous use of
civil or criminal sanctions. Furthermore, no matter how effective
federal or state policy is in regulating the actions of the government itself, those efforts are of little value if commercially motivated abuses on private land remain unchecked. When an archeological resource is lost, whether through private taking, public theft
or accidental damage, unique and truly irreplaceable data is lost
forever.
This article will examine ways in which the American legal
system has responded to accommodate cultural resources as a protected value. First, the development of federal cultural resource
policy will be briefly traced to determine its scope and effectiveness. Special attention will be given to the potential use of federal
policy as a model for state action. Second, the numerous state law
techniques for preserving archeological resources will be described
and evaluated, and the wide variety of statutory approaches and
different perceptions of the state's role in protecting cultural resources will be demonstrated. The relationship of federal policy development to that of the states also will be examined. Finally, a
series of recommendations for the enhancement of existing state
laws will be provided. Those suggestions will reflect the important
role of state government in preserving the nation's cultural history.
I. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CULTURAL RESOURCE POLICY

During the nineteenth century, the federal government had a
limited, but significant, involvement in cultural resource protection. Beginning in 1872 with the establishment of Yellowstone National Park, u the federal government began to remove areas of
unique scenic, scientific and historical value from settlement, sale
or occupancy. 14 By those reservations of land, the federal governunder his jurisdiction." 618 F.2d at 621.
Some states have also claimed title to archeological discoveries made on state and local
government lands. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80-401 (1974).
12. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 470(f) (1976).
13. See id. § 21.
14. Congress viewed the removal of particular parcels of public land as an effective,
low-cost method of preserving archeologically significant, or otherwise important, properties.
The inclusion of virtually unlimited presidential power to reserve federal lands for "national
monuments" in the 1906 Antiquities Act, see id. § 431 (originally enacted as Act of June 8,
1906, ch. 3060, § 2, 34 Stat. 225), reflected a major shift of responsibility to the executive
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ment preserved spectacular natural wonders and established the
legitimacy of withdrawing lands from the public domain as a
means of protecting them. In 1892, the reservation mechanism was
first used to protect an archeologically significant site-the Casa
Grande Indian ruins in Arizona-from damage caused by looters
and vandals. 111 Despite early recognition of the reservation technique, however, it was only available to preserve a limited number
of nationally significant sites because reservation of public land required express congressional action in each instance.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, federal policymakers became more active in archeological preservation by encouraging the acquisition of historically important private land.
During a period of nine years, the federal government acquired five
significant Civil War battlefields for preservation as military
parks. 16 Those parks were considered important to the nation because they were "fields of some of the most remarkable maneuvers
and most brilliant fighting in the War of Rebellion."~7 The establishment of military parlf~ as Civil War memorials marked the federal government's initial involvement in the acquisition, management and protection of places having national historical value.
During the same period, judicial precedents were established
that validated governmental preservation of historical properties.
For example, in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway,18
the United States Supreme Court determined that the exercise of
eminent domain powers in acquiring the Gettysburg battlefield
constituted a taking of private property for a valid public purpose.
Justice Peckham found that condemning private land for a nationally important commemorative park inculcated patriotism in the
public, a purpose in which "there can be no well founded doubt."~ 8
branch for cultural resource protection. It also emphasized the early idea that direct governmental ownership was the most effective preservation technique. The state/federal friction
inherent in the exercise of that power was well illustrated in Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp.
1155 (D. Alaska 1978), where the State of Alaska challenged a presidential declaration setting aside a large number of acres in the state as a national monument. Id. at 1159-60.
A number of states have also provided for the reservation of archeologically significant
state lands from sale. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-805 (1976); note 177 infra.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. From 1890 to 1899, the federal government established the Civil War battlefields
of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Shiloh, Gettysburg and Vicksburg as national military parks.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 424, 430f, 430g, 430h (1976).
17. Id. § 424.
18. 160 u.s. 668 (1896).
19. Id. at 680. In 1929, the Court, relying on Gettysburg Electric Railway, upheld a
Kansas statute permitting the use of state condemnation authority to acquire any tract or
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Thus, Gettysburg Electric Railway established the principle that
the acquisition and protection of places having significant historical value was a proper governmental function.
As the nineteenth century ended, federal cultural resource policy was limited to actual governmental ownership and control of a
small number of military and archeological monuments. However,
during the last quarter of that century, scientific organizations
were active in focusing the attention of the federal government and
the general public on the deteriorating condition of archeological
resources. 20 Privately funded expeditions to the southwest United
States ascertained that the Indian ruins in that region had been
seriously damaged by looters and vandals.21 The reports reaching
the East indicated such severe damage that prominent archeologists and their sponsors petitioned both Congress and the Department of the Interior as early as 1882 for assistance in protecting
the imperiled sites by preserving the artifacts and reserving the
sites from public sale. Unfortunately, public support was not yet
strong enough to force protective legislation.22 Even at that early
stage, the conflicting goals of conservationists and developers were
readily apparent. 23
In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years
parcel of land in the State of Kansas that possessed unusual historical interest. Roe v.
Smith, 278 U.S. 191 (1929). In accordance with the Supreme Court's approval of acquiring
culturally significant property through eminent domain, several states have specifically empowered state agencies and local governments to condemn cultural properties. See HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 6E-3(2) (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.09 (West 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 82120 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.53 (West 1967). However, some states have prohibited local governments from using eminent domain powers to acquire cultural properties.
See Miss. ConE ANN. § 39-13-9 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 253.403 (Vernon Supp.
1981).
20. See R.F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES Acr! OF 1906 1-12 (1970).
21. See id., at 14-18.
22. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts presented a petition from the New England Historic Genealogical Society requesting Congress to withhold lands in the Southwest from
public sale. Although the petition formally brought the question of antiquities protection
before Congress, it did not arouse sufficient interest to save the matter from an anonymous
death in the Senate Committee on Public Lands. See 13 CoNG. REc. 3777 (1882).
23. In the present context, that conflict is dramatically apparent in the effort to restrict unlimited presidential power, derived from the Antiquities Act, to declare national
monuments, thereby removing them from development and use. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
Alaska's Senator Gravel, concerned about the creation of 17 national monuments in Alaska,
which would have precluded oil and gas exploration on 56 million acres, sponsored a bill
that would have amended the Antiquities Act by limiting executive withdrawals to 5,000
acres without prior congressional approval. See 125 CoNG. REc. S10837 (daily ed. July 30,
1979). See also 15 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Docs. 121, 151 (Jan. 25, 1979) (President Carter's
State of the Union message outlining presidential action in preserving Alaskan wilderness
areas).
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of the twentieth century, public awareness of American archeology
was greatly enhanced by museum displays and other exhibitions of
artifacts. However, that rising awareness also brought increased
looting and consequent site damage. It became clear that federal
action was required if the nation's cultural resources were to be
preserved.
Although legislation was introduced as early as 1900 directing
the President to reserve selected archeological sites and prohibiting the unauthorized disturbance of archeological resources, lack of
national awareness and concern delayed congressional action. During that period of legislative inaction, federal land managers, relying on administrative authority, withdrew lands under their control from public sale, settlement or entry,24 which temporarily
protected identified sites until more formal action could be taken.
After six years of deliberation, Congress attempted to regulate
the looting and unauthorized exploitation of significant Indian artifacts and structures by passing the Antiquities Act of 1906.211 The
1906 Act specifically prohibited the appropriation, excavation, injury or destruction of any "historic or prehistoric ruin or monument or any object of antiquity located on federal land" without
first obtaining permission from the federal land manager6 andestablished criminal penalties of up to $500 in fines or ninety days
imprisonment or both.27 Congress anticipated the need for expert
examination and possible excavation of archeological sites and allowed "properly qualified" institutions to undertake the task pursuant to a federal permit.28 Additionally, the 1906 legislation gave
24. See Lee, supra note 20, at 47-77.
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976) (original version at ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906)). The
Antiquities Act was the only federal law prior to enactment of the 1979 Archeological Resources Protection Act, id. §§470aa-470ll (Supp. ill 1979), to preserve archeological sites
and artifacts on federal lands from the destructive actions of private individuals.
26. Id. § 433 (1976). Unfortunately, the terms "historic or prehistoric ruin or monument" and "object of antiquity" were not defined in the statute, which eventually resulted
in the invalidation of the statute as unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Diaz, 499
F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) (term "objects of antiquity" is unconstitutionally vague if the Antiquities Act prohibition included artifacts only three or four years old). But see United
States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979) (term "objects of antiquities" not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mimbres bowls 800-900 years old and like objects).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1976). Under the 1979 Archeological Resources Protection Act,
the criminal sanctions were significantly increased and combined with civil penalties. See id.
§§ 470ee-470ff (Supp. ill 1979).
28. Id. § 432 (1976). The administrative regulations issued under the 1906 Act state
that permits "will be granted . . • to reputable museums, universities, colleges or other recognized scientific or educational institutions, or to their duly authorized agents." 43 C.F.R. §
3.3 (1980).
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the President broad discretionary power to create national monuments by reserving qualified lands in the public domain. 29
Although historically important, the 1906 Antiquities Act
proved inadequate. The statute sought only to regulate cultural resources located on federal land and did not attempt to extend federal regulatory power to property held by states or individuals.
The drafters of the Antiquities Act seemed to approach the problem of archeological plunder as a question of federal land management rather than cultural protection. By design, the system relied
on the issuance of permits and the close supervision of federal officials to ensure that unauthorized excavation would not occur. The
vast expanse of territory under federal control, the limited number
of federal officials and the relative unimportance of administering
the Antiquities Act combined to reduce the effectiveness of the
statute. Finally, as time passed, it became apparent that the penalties provided in the Act, coupled with its lax enforcement,30 did
not deter potential violators. The weakness of the 1906 Act and the
increased market value of artifacts made the enactment of stronger
legislation inevitable.
Although no federal legislation for the protection of archeological sites and objects would be forthcoming for nearly thirty
years, several significant events occurred during that period which
influenced the course of cultural resource preservation. In the late
1920's, with the substantial financial support of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., the town of Williamsburg, Virginia, was restored to its preRevolutionary War condition. 31 That project resulted in the development of improved archeological field methods and drew public
attention to the careful restoration techniques employed.32 In the
1930's, the economic depression bolstered the federal government's
role in surveying and salvaging historically and archeologically significant properties. The Historic American Building Survey, which
29. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). That power has been frequently exercised and has led to
serious discord between at least one state and the federal government. See notes 14, 23
supra.
.
30. That ineffective enforcement was described well by Judge Merrill, in United States
v. Diaz, 449 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974): "Counsel on neither side was able to cite an instance
prior to this in which conviction under the [1906) statute was sought by the United States."
Id. at 114.
31. The restoration of that magnificant colonial city was largely attributable to the
initiative of Dr. W.A.R. Goodwin and the financial support of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. For a
textual and pictorial description of the restoration, see The Restoration of Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia, 78 THE ARE:HITECTURAL REcORD 356 (1935).
32. See T. KING, P. HICKMAN & G. BERG, ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION 21
(1977).
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preserved data concerning historical structures,33 provided employment for a large number of architects. Under the supervision of the
Smithsonian Institution, the Works Progress Administration
(WPA) hired a large number of unemployed persons to examine
and excavate archeological sites primarily located in the area affected by the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority.
When Congress enacted the Historic Sites Act in 1935,34 federal cultural resource policy expanded broadly from the initial position taken by the Antiquities Act. The new statute declared that
it was the "national policy to preserve for public use historic sites,
buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration
and benefit of the people of the United States."35 The statute continued the preexisting policy of focusing on sites having national,
rather than local or regional, significance. The concept of public
use of historical properties, which may have reflected Congress' interest in establishing public museums, was also maintained in the
law. However, by emphasizing the preservation of historical and
prehistoric sites, the Act apparently rejected the salvage approach
embraced by the federally sponsored WPA program.
The 1935 Act accorded the National Park Service central authority to carry out the federal government's program of historical
and archeological preservation. 36 Specifically, the National Park
Service was directed to gather documentary information on historical and archeological resources through survey and examination of
those sites, 37 thereby involving the federal government in a continuing process of identifying and evaluating cultural resources
throughout the nation.
The 1935 Act embraced the idea of public ownership of sites
as a major mechanism for the protection of historical and archeological resource areas. To achieve that purpose, the agency was
33. See Fowler, supra note 4, at 1479 & n.44.
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 {1976) {original version at ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 {1935)).
35. Id. § 461.
36. Id. §§ 462, 464. In 1916, the National Park Service was established as a separate
entity within the Department of Interior:
[The National Park Service] shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas
known as national parks, monuments, and reservations .•. by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.
Id. § 1.
37. Id. §§ 462{a)-{c).
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permitted to acquire "by gift, purchase, or otherwise" both real
and personal property and to restore significant properties for the
public's benefit.38 The statute also encouraged the development of
historical or archeological sites as public museums, possibly in response to the Williamsburg restoration project.39 As a result, fiftysix historical sites have been established under the authority of the
1935 statute.40 Although the actual accomplishments of the 1935
Act may have been modest, it did serve to reinforce federal involvement in cultural resource protection and placed the primary
responsibility for federal historical preservation in the Department
of the Interior.
There was little legislative activity in the area of cultural resource protection in the years immediately following World War
Il.41 However, federal development of public resources rapidly expanded in number and scope, often affecting areas of archeological
significance.42 In response to those impacts, federal agencies fre38. Id. §§ 462(d), (f); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668, 680-83
(1896), apparently permitted federal condemnation for the purpose of historical preservation. See text accompanying note 18 supra. In Barnidge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th
Cir. 1939), the c.ourt held that the Secr.etary of Interior could condemn private property
under the authority of the Historic Sites Act, provided that compensation was ultimately
paid to the private owner. The Eighth Circuit found that the "or otherwise" language in the
1935 act permitted condemnation under the general federal eminent domain authority. Id.
at 297-98. The only question remaining was whether the Interior Department's purpose in
acquiring the old St. Louis, Missouri site constituted a public use. The court concluded:
"[W]e think there can be no reasonable doubt that the proposed use of this land is a public
one." Id. at 299.
39. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
41. In 1949, Congress did enact legislation creating the National Trust for Historic
Preservation in the United States. See id. §§ 468(a)-(d) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of
Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 755, § 1, 63 Stat. 927). The Trust, established as a "charitable, educational, and nonprofit corporation," was expected to acquire, through a variety of means,
"sites, buildings and objects significant in American history or culture" and to undertake a
preservation program. Id. § 468c(f). Modeled in part after the British National Trust, the
American organization was intended to supplement federal preservation efforts and to serve
as the recipient of private contributions, which otherwise probably would not be made to
the federal government. See Letter from J.A. Krug, Secretary of Interior, to Congressman J.
Hardin Peterson, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, reprinted in [1949]
U.S. ConE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2285, 2287-88.
42. The legislative history of the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 reflects the acceleration of federal water development activities that had damaging effects on archeological resources. In a letter supporting the enactment of protective legislation, Assistant Secretary of
the Interior Fred G. Aandahl stated:
With the increased industrialization and greater Federal activity in construction
of large-scale multipurpose water control projects, the problem of salvaging and preserving archeological and historical antiquities of national significance in advance of
destruction becomes ever more critical. The bill emphasizes the point that the neces-
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quently undertook archeological salvage as part of their operations.-'3 That trend was reflected in federal highway legislation""
and, most notably, in the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960.45
The Reservoir Salvage Act provided for a system of interagency notification and funding of salvage activities in the face of
federal dam construction that might "cause irreparable loss or destruction of significant scientific, prehistorical, historical, or archeological data. " 46 The intent of the statute was to ensure that archeological investigation and salvage operations would begin at the
planning stage of a federally owned or federally licensed dam.47 An
important feature of the Act was the creation of a consultation
procedure between the project agency and the Department of the
Interior concerning the cultural resource impact of a proposed
dam. The Interior Department was authorized to survey project locations for significant archeological data and to recover and preserve that which was discovered.-' 8 Those procedures further reinsary archeological and historical salvage should be performed in advance of such construction activities, and it reflects a growing public awareness of their increasing loss
of this national heritage through such Federal and private activities.
H.R. REP. No. 1392, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 2403, 2405. See also S. REP. No. 1110, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1949]
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2285-86 (report on legislation creating the National Trust for
Historic Preservation). The effects of increased urbanization occurring during the 1950's and
1960's resulted in the establishment of a federal environmental policy that addressed cultural resource protection. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1976).
43. The House Committee Report on the 1960 Reservoir Salvage Act indicated that at
least one federal agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, had cooperated with archeological
salvage activities on its projects under authority of the 1935 Historic Sites Act, and that the
Army believed the 1960 legislation was unnecessary. See H.R. REP. No. 1392, supra note 42,
at 3-4, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2405-06.
44. See 23 U.S.C. § 305 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 27, 1958, PUB. L. No.
85-767, 72 Stat. 913). As part of a highway project, that statute made federal funding available for survey and salvage work for archeological and paleontological objects "having National, State, or local historical or scientific significance." 23 C.F.R. § 765 (1980). The statute
reflected a legislative attitude favoring a funding system over avoidance of such sites in
project planning.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 469 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 27, 1960, PUB. L. No. 86523, 74 Stat. 220).
46. !d. § 469a-1.
47. A Committee Report indicated that the purpose of the statute was "to place this
salvage program, so far as it relates to the construction of dams, on a firmer basis by establishing definite procedures for coordination of archeological investigations and salvage operations with the planning and construction of dams by Federal agencies or under permits
granted by Federal agencies." H.R. REP. No. 1392, supra note 42, at 1, reprinted in [1960]
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2403-04. The drafters believed that the statute would make
agency responsibilities mandatory where they had previously been considered discretionary.
Id. at 2, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 2404.
48. In addition, the 1960 Act specifically allowed up to one percent of the funds appro-
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forced the Interior Department's role as the expert agency in
cultural resource protection. The potential scope of the survey and
salvage program was broadened in 1974 by the enactment of the
Archeological and Historical Preservation Act (AHPA),"9 which extended the prior law to encompass "any alteration of the terrain
caused as a result of any Federal construction project or federally
licensed activity or program."150
The primary purpose of the federal program authorized by the
Reservoir Salvage Act and the AHPA was the preservation of data
by investigation and salvage techniques rather than by requiring
agency project planning that was sensitive to cultural resource protection and that avoided the use of historically and archeologically
significant lands. 151 The program was intended to lessen the depriated for most dam construction projects to be used for archeological resource investigation and salvage. See 16 U.S.C. § 469c(a) (1976). The Act authorized separate funding for
the Interior Department's activities. See id. §§ 469c(b)-(c).
49. I d. §§ 469-469c (1976 & Supp. ill 1979) (originally enacted as Act of May 24, 1974,
PUB. L. No. 93-291, 88 Stat. 174).
50. !d. § 469 (1976). The scope of the revised statute was intended to be quite broad.
In its section-by-section analysis of the Act, the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee stated:
[T]his legislation broadens that policy [to preserve and recover historical or archeological data] to include any Federal or federally assisted construction projects involving the alteration of the terrain, as well as other Federally licensed projects, or Federal activities or programs which disrupt such values.
H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. NEWS
3168, 3172. The Committee's report made it clear that the review process would be triggered
not only by construction projects but by an agency awareness that its "program or federally
assisted construction project or activity will cause the loss of scientific, prehistorical, historical, archeological or paleontological data." Id. Apparently, that broad interpretation of
agency obligations under the 1974 Act has not been judicially affirmed.
51. However, the House Committee Report on the 1974 Act contained language indicating a recognition that site preservation was preferable to excavation and salvage. The
Committee noted:
Much of the loss of these nonrenewable resources can be avoided by proper advance planning and survey work. Sometimes, where a significant area is known to
exist, projects could be relocated without substantially interfering with the end result.
Preservation of archeological, paleontological, and other historic and scientific sites
is nearly always considered preferable to their excavation unless the data is considered critical to current studies. In some cases, however, there are no alternatives to
the destruction of the site. In such situations, prompt and careful surveys can determine what course of action should be taken and proper excavation techniques can
salvage and preserve the materials found. It is the achievement of this end which
H.R. 296 seeks to accomplish.
Id. at 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. NEws, at 3171 (emphasis added). The
Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service of the Department of the Interior (HCRS)
issued a "Statement of Program Approach" regarding the AHPA. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18117
(1979). The HCRS specifically noted in its program statement that:
Resource salvage generally is less preferable than preservation in situ. After
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structive effects of development by locating, identifying and removing culturally significant items. However, that approach did
not preserve sites in their undisturbed state.
In the 1960's, the growth of the environmental movement led
to the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 62 in 1969. The movement also influenced the passage of a
broad range of other laws63 and the issuance of executive orders
addressing specialized environmental concerns. Within the emerging concept of environmental quality, cultural resource values were
explicitly recognized as a component of a desirable quality of life.
Many of the protections available to more familiar environmental
interests were extended to include cultural resources. 64 In addition
to the assimilation of cultural resource values into the general concept of environmental quality, specialized protective statutes were
designed to address narrow cultural resource issues. The National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) 66 is a prime example of
that development and is potentially one of the most important
specialized federal statutes.
The NHPA significantly extended federal cultural resource
policy in a number of ways. First, the statute articulated a new
federal position regarding cultural values. It emphasized the presidentification of resources during the initial planning stages of a project, Federal
agencies should give full consideration to courses of action that will not necessitate
salvage.
Id. at 18118.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Jan. 1, 1970, PUB. L. No. 91190, 83 Stat. 852).
53. See Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1976) (originally
enacted as Act of Oct. 2, 1968, PUB. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906); Endangered Species Act of
1973, id. §§ 1531-1543 (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 12, 1973, PUB. L. No. 93-205, 87
Stat. 884). See also W. RoDGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.12 (1977); Rosenberg & Olson, Federal Environmental Review Requirements Other Than NEPA: The
Emerging Challenge, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 195 (1978).
54. The most obvious protection was the inclusion of cultural resource issues in the
environmental impact statement required by NEPA. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v.
Gribble, 378 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The history of the Warm Springs Dam case was
complicated by subsequent actions for permanent injunctions on different grounds; however,
the archeological considerations stated here were approved by all subsequent courts. See
417 U.S. 1301 (1974) (Douglas, J., sitting as circuit judge for the Ninth Circuit); No. 74-1968
(9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1975) (unpublished memorandum decision); 431 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Cal.
1977); 565 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977); 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1977); Concerned About Trident v.
Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1977);
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976).
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15,
1966, PUB. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915).
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ervation of historical and cultural properties and objects "as a living part of our community life in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people."116 That approach deviated from
preexisting policy by focusing on active federal encquragement of
preservation as a protective strategy. Moreover, the underlying rationale for cultural resource protection shifted from emphasizing
the patriotic dimension of historical preservation117 to stressing a
sense of human orientation within the historical continuum. Second, the Act expanded the scope of federal protection to include
sites having local or regional importance but lacking a national significance,118 thereby reemphasizing that historical preservation is a
matter of community and state importance.119 Third, the Act had
the effect of regulating federal agency activities that might affect
cultural resources. The NHPA required all federal agencies to consult with the newly created Advisory Council on Historic Preservation60 whenever federal projects or other "undertakings" could affect historically or archeologically significant sites.61 Although
consultation was mandatory, the Council's function was intended
to be only advisory. An executive order issued in 197162 clarified
those agency obligations, and a later legislative change extended
the scope of the NHPA provision to properties "eligible" for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places.63
The full impact of the executive order and the legislative
amendment was recognized after the Advisory Council issued im56. !d. § 470(b) (1976).
57. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
58. See Fowler, supra note 4, at 1484-88.
59. Under the NHPA, financial assistance was made available to states to initiate
"comprehensive statewide historic surveys and plans •.• for the preservation, acquisition,
and development of [cultural properties]." 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(1) (1976). In addition, the Act
provided matching grants to states for the actual preservation of significant historical
properties. !d. § 470a(a)(2). Those funds, which have increased significantly since 1966, provided great incentive for state action in historical and archeological protection.
Under the authority of the 1966 Act, a Historic Preservation Fund was established to
finance the activities authorized by the statute. Surprisingly, support for the fund came
from revenues derived from the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Authorized appropriations for the 1977 fiscal year were $24.4 million and were increased to $150 million for the
1981 fiscal year. See id. § 470h (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
60. See id. §§ 470i-470t.
61. !d. § 470(f) (1976). That subsection would seem to apply to both detrimental and
beneficial effects of federal actions.
62. See Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470
app., at 429 (1976).
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 28, 1976, PUB. L.
No. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1313).
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plementing regulations in early 1974. 64 The Advisory Council procedures required a federal agency to consult with a State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) when determining how agency activities would affect historical or archeological sites.65 In certain cases,
the procedures also required the SHPO, along with the Advisory
Council and the interested federal agency, to reach written agreement on mitigation of any adverse effects expected from a federal
project.68
The Advisory Council procedures placed a significant obligation on federal agencies. By itself, NEPA requires agencies to evaluate the effects of their activities on cultural as well as ecological
resources. 67 The NHPA, as implemented through the Advisory
Council procedures, often requires additional investigation and
documentation of cultural resource impact beyond that required
by NEPA in an environmental impact statement.68 Those additional requirements may be particularly onerous where archeological properties are involved because their presence and precise loca64. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.17 (1974).
65. Strict time limits are imposed on the SHPO, and if no response to a request for his
opinion is received within 30 days, concurrence is presumed. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1980).
66. ld. § 800.6(c) (1979). The Advisory Council procedures also contain specified re-view periods, which can delay federal projects. For instance, the Advisory Council may take
30 days to review a "no adverse effect" determination made by a federal agency. That review follows the required survey activities, consultations with the SHPO and a determination of eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places by the Heritage Conservation
and Recreation Service. Id. § 800.4(a)(3).
67. 42 u.s.c. § 4331(b)(4) (1976).
68. Recent amendments to the Advisory Council's regulations were addressed to questions of NEPA compliance. Those new regulations suggested that agencies should coordinate their NEPA and NHPA review processes, although at the same time, stating that the
two statutes are "independent." 36 C.F.R. § 800.9 (1979). The Council on Environmental
Quality regulations concerning federal environmental impact statement preparation direct
NEPA compliance to be combined with other statutory requirements "to the fullest extent
possible." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (1980). In the policy statement, the proposed NEPA regulations direct federal agencies, "to the fullest extent possible," to "integrate the requirements
of NEPA with their planning and environmental review procedures so that all such procedures run concurrently rather than consecutively." ld. § 1500.2(c). The intention is to
streamline all federal environmental review.
Cases have been brought alleging damage to cultural interests and violations of NEPA
or NHPA or both. See WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979}; District of Columbia
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Adams, 571 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1978); Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v.
Harris, 490 F. Supp. 1334, 1341-42 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314,
316-20 (D. Mass. 1980}; Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 692-94 (D.P.R. 1979); Hall City
Historical Soc'y v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978). Furthermore, courts have found standing where plaintiffs are claiming that the demolition of an
historical property would cause an injury in fact to their collective aesthetic interests. See
Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 632 F.2d 21, 23-24
(6th Cir. 1980).
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tion usually cannot be detected without field surveys, which
occasionally involve subsurface excavation.
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit declared, in United States v.
Diaz, 69 that the criminal penalty provisions of the Antiquities Act
were unconstitutionally vague. At the time Diaz was decided, it
was apparent that the penalties provided by the Antiquities Act,
even if judicially upheld, would not deter those who were damaging
archeological sites and pilfering artifacts. Because archeological objects had become extremely valuable on domestic and international
art markets,70 the weak and infrequently imposed penalties were
undoubtedly viewed by commercially motivated looters as a minor
cost of doing business. The lack of an effective legal sanction, combined with the tremendous area to be supervised, created a serious
threat to the future of America's cultural resources.
The frustration resulting from the Diaz decision and the consensus of opinion that a statutory change was necessary moved
Congress to enact the Archeological Resources Protection Act71 in
1979. The expedited treatment of that legislation reflected a common perception that immediate action was warranted.72 Although
Congress avoided one controversial element of the 1906 Antiquities
Act-the unfettered presidential power to declare national monuments on federallands 73-it was willing to address itself to the primary task of developing a new regulatory program for the control
of archeological exploration and recovery.
69. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit includes Arizona, California, Nevada, Idaho, Oregon, Washington and Montana. Five years after Diaz, the Tenth Circuit, in
United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (lOth Cir. 1979), upheld the Antiquities Act. That
circuit is comprised of New Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Oklahoma, Kansas and Wyoming. The
split of opinion between those two judicial circuits is significant because a great number of
archeological sites are located in those states.
70. See note 10 supra.
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470ee (Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 31,
1979, PUB. L. No. 96-95, § 2-6, 93 Stat. 721). For a discussion of that legislation, see Rosenberg, Federal Protection for Archeological Resources, 22 ARiz. L. REV. 701 (1981).
72. All the witnesses who testified at the legislative hearings held on the proposed act
agreed that a statutory amendment was necessary. See Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at
89.
73. The seriousness of that issue can be seen in the extraordinary effort made by Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska to have the unlimited discretionary powers of the President
restricted. See id., app. at 137-45; 125 CoNG. REc. S10,836-42 (daily ed. July 30, 1979) (remarks of Senator Gravel). Senator Gravel introduced an amendment to the Antiquities Act
land withdrawal provision, which would have required a concurrent resolution of Congress
approving any withdrawal of more than 5,000 acres. That requirement would have applied
retroactively to invalidate an earlier presidential declaration pertaining to Alaskan lands.
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The 1979 Act emphasized a federal permit program74 to control access to archeologically significant sites that were located on
federal land. In an effort to avoid a constitutional attack based on
vagueness, the statute explicitly defined a number of important
terms, leaving no doubt about when a permit would be required. 75
In addition, the Act set out four considerations to be taken into
account before issuing a permit for excavation on federal lands.
First, it must be shown that an applicant is "qualified" to
carry out the proposed activity.78 The permit request must describe the proposed work in enough detail to enable the federal
official to assess the applicant's technical competence to complete
the project in a professional manner. Even though the Act substantially expanded the range of persons and organizations allowed to
excavate archeological properties,77 anyone applying for a permit
must be shown to be qualified. That requirement could force professional archeological organizations to license or certify their
members to make them eligible for work on federal lands. In the
74. That permit procedure must be considered in combination with the civil and criminal sanctions also provided in the Act to comprehend the emerging congressional policy of
cultural resource protection. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(d)-470ff (Supp. III 1979).
75. See id. §§ 470bb-470cc. The statute states:
Any person may apply to the Federal land manager to excavate or remove any
archaeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands and to carry out activities associated with such excavation and removal. The application [must] contain
such information as the Federal land manager deems necessary, including information concerning the time, scope, and location and specific purpose of the proposed
work.
Id. § 470cc(a). The language of that provision should have more clearly indicated the
mandatory nature of the application by using the words "shall apply" rather than "may
apply" because the failure to procure such a permit could lead to the imposition of significant criminal sanctions. See id. § 470ee(d).
76. Id. § 470cc(b)(1). The precise nature of a permittee's requisite "qualifications" is
uncertain because there was no discussion of the issue in the legislative debates. However,
the Senate hearings do provide some insight. Dr. Ernest A. Connally, Associate Director of
the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service of the Department of the Interior, in
response to a question posed by Senator Bumpers of Arkansas, noted:
[The new law] would change the definition somewhat, and would allow qualified persons rather than just institutions as such to do it. So that it would include, for example, State Historic Preservation Officers or other people who are qualified and might
have the financial means of a private individual, say a philanthropist.
[The bill] would give him the opportunity . . . to go in for an investigation with
proper scientific personnel and equipment . . . rather than limit [exploration] as
strictly as we do at the present time to educational or scientific institutions and professional organizations and associations linked to recognized institutions.
Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 53. See also id. at 56. The wisdom of such an approach
appears questionable in light of the limited supervision actually given to site exploration
activlties.
77. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1976) with id. §§ 470bb(6), 470cc(a) (Supp. III 1979).
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absence of formal professional certification, some minimum level of
experience and training should be required to ensure high quality
work.
Second, the proposed activity must be "undertaken for the
purpose of furthering archeological knowledge in the public interest. " 78 That requirement reserves authorized exploration on federal
lands for noncommercial purposes and ensures that the nation's
cultural resources will only be disturbed for the advancement of
scientific knowledge and ,public understanding.
Third, the archeological resources removed from the site remain the property of the United States; those items, along with
associated archeological records and data, must be preserved by a
suitable institution.79 That provision reiterates the position that
artifacts found on federal land are a national resource unavailable
for private ownership.80 It also emphasizes the importance of preserving not only the artifact itself but the scientific data derived in
the course of investigating the site. Also reflected, however, is the
policy that federal lands are available for exploration81 and that
material remains of prior cultures found on federal land may be
removed. The statute does not express support for a preservation
78. Id. § 470cc(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
79. Id. § 470cc(b)(3). It may be difficult to keep the artifacts and the related data
physically together because archeological resources may be transferred between universities,
museums or other institutions. The Act invites the Secretary of Interior to develop regulations governing the exchange between institutions of archeological resources from federal or
Indian lands. I d. § 470dd(1). It also permits the Interior Department to establish rules governing the "ultimate disposition" of both newly discovered items and those found under
prior authorities. I d. § 470dd(2). The meaning of that provision is unclear. In all cases where
archeological resources are taken from Indian lands, the consent of the Indian or Indian
tribe owning the land or having jurisdiction must be received before the resource can be
transferred. Id. § 470dd.
By comparison, state laws usually clearly establish title to artifacts discovered on state
lands in the state and often define the location of state repositories for the uncovered items.
See, e.g., DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 7, § 5304 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12(3) (West 1975).
Some states limit excavation permits to state residents and forbid the removal of artifacts
from the jurisdiction. See, e.g., ALA. ConE §§ 41-3-2, -5 (1977).
80. See 43 C.F.R. § 3.17 (1980).
81. The Archeological Resources Protection Act allows exploration on lands having
religious as well as scientific significance. The Act only requires the federal land manager
issuing a permit to notify "any Indian tribe which may consider the site as having religious
or cultural importance." 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (Supp. III 1979). That procedure may conflict
with the provisions of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1966 (Supp.
III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 11, 1978, PUB. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469), which
declared the federal policy "to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions • . . including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites." Id.
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oriented theory favoring the protection of significant sites. In that
subtle way, the 1979 Act may encourage the destruction of sites to
preserve particular artifacts.
The fourth requirement for issuance of a permit is that the
proposed work plan must not be "inconsistent with any management plan" applicable to the land involved. 82 In effect, a permit
proposal may not be granted if it will unreasonably interfere with
another use of the land, such as grazing, mining, oil and gas exploration, forestry or land reclamation. Through thai condition, Congress made certain that the protective purpose of the Act, which
was to regulate archeological site exploration and excavation and
to deter commercially motivated looters, would not be used to impose additional restrictions on development activity review requirements. 83 For that reason, the permit procedure was statutorily
freed from the review requirements of the National Historic Preservation Act,8 " although multiple use activities remain subject to
the specialized review process required by that statute.811
The 1979 Act combined a permit program with enhanced enforcement techniques in the form of strengthened civil and criminal penalties to deter illicit excavation of sites,86 but required a
high level of surveillance and enforcement by federal land managers. The Act demonstrated continued congressional support for
archeological site and artifact protection within the context of federalland management. As a reinforcement and further articulation
of the 1906 Antiquities Act coverage, however, the 1979 statute is
limited in its scope to federal lands. The Act made no effort to
extend any federal regulatory power to nonfederal lands. Consequently, state and privately owned lands possessing significant
archeological resources may be excavated without any federal intervention. In the absence of other legal restrictions, that lack of
federal regulation could result in the loss of irreplaceable sites, ar82. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
83. The House Committee Report reflected the belief that properly authorized multiple use activities would protect archeological sites from disturbance. See H.R. REP. No. 311,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979). The implication to be drawn from that report is that archeological resources are better protected under the NHPA and the NEPA than under the
ARPA. See notes 54, 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(i) (Supp. III 1979). See also notes 60-68 supra and accompanying text.
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). The regulations issued by the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation implement the review process and make clear the broad range of federal and federally related actions for which an evaluation of effect must be made. See 36
C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (1980).
86. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470cc, 470ee, 470ft' (Supp. III 1979).
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tifacts and information.
The next section of this article will discuss and evaluate the
broad variety of state and local policies and legal techniques that
can be employed to protect archeological resources.
II.

OVERVIEW OF STATE ARcHEOLOGY LEGISLATION

Before examining specific features of state archeology legislation, several general points are worth noting. First, laws protecting
archeological sites and artifacts exist in almost every jurisdiction.
Because some states enacted legislation as early as 1906, while
others acted only within the last decade, there is a wide range in
the approaches to and the scope of government intervention. Second, there is a great variation in the complexity and detail of legislation in states having archeology protection laws. Those variations
reflect the tendency of legislative draftsmen to focus on regionally
different archeological interests rather than following a uniform
model in formulating their state programs. Some states have been
primarily concerned about underwater archeology or American Indian sites; others have sought to protect colonial or prehistoric
sites. Finally, it is apparent that states have established new archeological programs or have recently reinforced existing ones to establish eligibility for funding under the NHPA. A closer analysis of
the specific approaches and legal techniques employed throughout
the nation will reveal the rich variety of state law options available
to protect archeological resources.

A. Policy Statements
It is not uncommon in the articulation of state cultural resource policy to find a statement that it is within the public interest to protect enumerated places and objects to preserve the cultural heritage of the state,87 or to fulfill a moral obligation to
succeeding generations to preserve irreplaceable state values.88
Most states declare, either by statute or constitutional provision,
87. See, e.g., WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.010 (Supp. 1980). The concept of states'
cultural history and that of Native American groups or other individuals can come into
conflict. For instance, the professional interests of the archeologist and agency planner can
be diametrically opposed to that of Native Americans. See, e.g., Winter, Indian Heritage
Preservation and Archeologists, 45 AM. ANTIQUITIES 121 (1980). State policy encouraging
the excavation of burial sites can raise serious ethical problems. For an excellent discussion
of that issue, see Rosen, The Excavation of American Indian Burial Sites: A Problem in
Law and Professional Responsibility, 82 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 5 (1980).
88. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1b(3), (6) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
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that the protection of cultural resources, including archeological
sites, constitutes a public benefit. 89 Those statements recognize, in
one fashion or another, the importance of historical places to the
citizens of the state. 90 Some states' policy declarations have established cultural resources as important environmental assets and,
consequently, have incorporated them into an expanding environmental quality concept. 91 Other states have emphasized the importance of protecting archeological sites and objects threatened by
encroaching human activities because they are unique sources of
scientific information. 92 A number of jurisdictions have authorized
comprehensive programs of historical preservation to promote the
use and conservation of historical properties for the "education, inspiration, pleasure, and enrichment" of the citizenry.93 Finally, legislative or constitutional policy statements often specifically authorize, as a protective measure, the acquisition of archeological or
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-904 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Arkansas statute provides a sweeping declaration of state policy favoring cultural resource protection:
The General Assembly hereby determines that the historical, archeological, architectural, and cultural heritage of Arkansas is among the most important economic and
environmental assets of this State and that rapid development threatens to remove
the remaining vestiges of Arkansas' proud and unique heritage. Therefore, it is
hereby declared to be public policy and in the best interests of the general economic,
social, and educational welfare of all the citi2ens of Arkansas for this State to engage
in a comprehensive program of historic preservation, undertaken at all levels of the
government of Arkansas and its political subdivisions, to promote the use and preservation of such property for the public interest and the education, inspiration, pleasure, and enrichment of the citizens of this State.

I d.
90. See ALAsKA STAT. § 41.35.010 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-904 (Supp. 1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.061 (West 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-1 (1976); IDAHO CODE§ 674119 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-2715 (1977); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin
1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1601 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 371
(1974); Mo. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 2-301 (1974); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 399.202 (1976); Miss.
CoDE ANN. § 39-7-3 (1973); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. §§ 22-3-101, 23-1-101 (1979); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 227-C:1 (1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-2 (1978); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-10-01
(1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1b (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-2
(1977); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 1-20-17 (1980); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-18-18 (1978); VA.
CODE§ 10-150.2 (1978); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.010 (Supp. 1981).
91. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:1 (1978), which provides:
The legislature of New Hampshire has determined that the historical, archeological, architectural and cultural heritage of New Hampshire is among the most important environmental assets of the state and that the rapid social and economic development of contemporary society threatens the remaining vestiges of this heritage

See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-1 (1976).
92. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin 1977); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 372 (1974).
93. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2715 (1977).
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historical properties through condemnation.94
To accomplish those generally stated purposes, state programs
have been authorized to manage cultural resources within the
framework of state government. Often, the archeological values of
a state are encompassed within the broader definition of historical
properties or cultural resources and are, thus, under the control of
the state's historical preservation program. However, there are examples of independent policy statements regarding archeological
resources95 that are usually effectuated by separate organizational
structures having jurisdiction over archeological sites and artifacts.

B. State Regulatory Control of Activities on State Land
The vast majority of states have established regulatory controls to prevent the unauthorized excavation of archeological sites
located on state lands. 98 State statutes normally prohibit the exploration and excavation of sites and the removal of artifacts without a state issued permit,97 thereby seeking to control permissible
94. See MoNT. CoNST. art. IX, § 4. See also notes 183-185 infra and accompanying
text.
95. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.705 (Baldwin 1977).
96. See .ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.080 (Supp. 1977); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-842 (1974);
CAL. PUB. REs. ConE§ 5097.5 (West 1972); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 24-80-406 (1974); DEL. ConE
ANN. tit. 7, § 5302 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); GA. ConE ANN. § 40-813a
(1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133c3 (Smith-Hurd 1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5403
(1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.720 (Baldwin 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West
Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1974); MD. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. §§ 2-305 to
-306 (1974); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 9, § 27C (West 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 299.53
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.36 (West 1979); Miss. ConE ANN. § 39-1-19 (1972); MoNT.
REv. ConEs ANN. §§ 22-3-432, -442 (1979); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 381.199-.283 (1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 18-6-9(B) (1978); N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 233(5) (McKinney 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 70-4 (1981) (indian relics); id. § 121-25 (shipwrecks); N.D. CENT. ConE § 55-03-01 (1972);
OHIO REv. ConE ANN. § 149-54 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309 (West 1972);
OR. REv. STAT. § 97.745 (1979) (indian graves); id. § 273.705(a) (historical and archeological
materials); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1c, .1i (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 4245.1-5, -10, -12 (1977); S.C. ConE§ 54-7-230 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN.§§ 1-2031, -32 (1980); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-6-105 (1980); TEx. REs. ConE ANN. tit. 9, § 191.093
(Vernon 1978); UTAH ConE ANN.§ 63-18-25 (1978); VA. ConE§ 10-145.9(C) (1981) (underwater); id. § 10-150.5 (1978) (objects of antiquity); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 27.53.060 (Supp.
1979); W.VA. CoDE§ 29-1-7 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 27.012 (West 1973); WYo. STAT.§ 361-114 (1977).
97. Statutes vary greatly in the specificity with which they describe the prohibited
conduct. Compare WASH. REV. ConE ANN.§ 27.53.060 (Supp. 1980) with WYo. STAT.§ 36-1114 (1977). Statutes also vary in the way they describe protected archeological resources.
For instance, Virginia statutes employ the term "object of antiquity" to denominate the
items to be protected. Probably drawn from the federal Antiquities Act of 1906, that term
was found unconstitutionally vague by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d
113 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text. Fortunately, the Virginia
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site exploration and eliminate site looting. As under federallaw, 98
violation of a prohibition against unpermitted site activity usually
constitutes a minor criminal infraction punishable by relatively
short imprisonment or modest fines or both. 99 In addition to fines
or imprisonment, state criminal laws may require a convicted person to forfeit the archeological artifacts illegally removed from a
protected site. 100
As with the federal program,101 states generally make permits
available only to parties who possess a demonstrated professional
competence in archeological investigation.102 However, a number of
legislature defined the term in another section of the statute. See VA. CoDE § 10-150.3(E)
(1978).
98. See notes 27, 86 supra and accompanying text.
99. As a general proposition, state criminal laws treat the pillage of archeological sites
as a relatively insignificant offense; consequently, they provide little deterrence against looting. Moreover, the absence of reported cases suggests that detection and prosecution of
those offenses occurs only infrequently.
Typically, criminal penalty provisions specify maximum punishments of up to six
months imprisonment and up to $500 in fines. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-846
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.13(1) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5408 (1980); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1k (Purdon Supp. 1981); W.VA. CODE§ 29-1-7 (1980). Virginia has
enacted the most stringent criminal penalty provision by classifying the violation as a class
1 misdemeanor, punishable with a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to 12
months or both. VA. CODE § 10-150.10 (1978). Virginia also requires the forfeiture of all
underwater historical objects illegally recovered, id. § 10-145.9(E), but does not require forfeiture of objects of antiquity found on land, id. § 10-150.10. Some states only impose a fine
of $10 for conviction. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 299.55 (1967). Others punish with an
optional jail term as short as 10 days. See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 11-6-112 (1980). A review
of state criminal penalty provisions indicates that the statutory maximum punishment for
archeological site damage and looting is far less than the cost of damage caused. The penalties available under federal law are far more stringent. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(d), 470ff(a)(2)
(Supp. III 1979). However, Idaho has enacted a unique treble damages civil penalty providing "triple the amount of the cost and expense of repairing, replacing, and reconstructing
said [archeological] site •••." IDAHO CoDE § 67-4118 (1973).
100. At least 12 states require forfeiture of illegally taken objects. See IDAHo CODE §
67-4122 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5408 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 381.223 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CoDE § 55-03-07 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(h) (West 1972); OR. REv.
STAT. § 273.711 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1k (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.D. CoDIFIED
LAws ANN. § 1-20-35 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 791 (1978); VA. CoDE § 10-145.9(E)
(1978); WYo. STAT. § 36-1-116 (1977). Considering the escalating value of archeological artifacts on the national and international art markets, forfeiture of illegally removed objects
should be uniformly required to dissuade commercially motivated looters. Federal law goes
even further by providing for the forfeiture not only of the illegally taken archeological resources but also "all vehicles and equipment • • • which were used in connection with such
violation." 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b) (Supp. III 1979).
101. See generally notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text.
102. A number of statutes allow the permitting agency to determine the attributes of a
qualified permittee. See, e.g., F'LA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127,
§ 133c4 (Smith-Hurd 1967); MD. NAT. REs. CoDE ANN. § 2-306 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
9, § 27C (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 138.36(2) (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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jurisdictions require no showing of expertise or experience to obtain a permit, 103 and some allow amateurs to undertake field
explorations. 104
With one significant exception,105 state regulatory control of
archeological sites limits lawful excavation to those activities conducted in the public interest106 and denies a permittee any reward
from the artifacts found at the site. Some states insist that archeo70, § 8339(b) (West 1972). Others provide specific statutory guidance. See, e.g., NEv. REV.
STAT. § 381.203 (1979) (four-part test).
103. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-7 (1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West Supp.
1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.53 (1967); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.1i(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981); Wvo.
STAT. § 36-1-114 (1977).
104. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 764 (1978); VA. CoDE§ 10-150.5(8) (1978). Because
of the minimal governmental supervision of excavation, granting permits to amateur archeologists may be undesirable. The use of improper techniques could result in site damage and
loss of unique data. The State of Washington, while allowing amateur societies to undertake
excavations, requires that a written proposal "detailing the scope and duration of the activity" be reviewed by an expert state agency prior to approval. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §
27.53.080 (Supp. 1980).
105. States with underwater archeological resources often have statutes that regard
the sunken shipwrecks within state waters as salvage items within a traditional maritime
context. Specifically, states allow salvors a percentage of the salvaged materials as compensation for their activities. Such a reward system is unfortunate because it encourages salvage
operations that consider the recovered materials more a financial treasure than a unique
archeological resource. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.1605, .1606 (West Supp. 1980) (percentage of cash value of objects recovered); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 39-7-17 (1973) (percentage of
cash value of objects recovered); NEv. REv. STAT. § 381.207 (1979) (50% of artifacts to permittee); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1981) (portion of all relics may be sold or retained by the
licensee); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(a) (West 1972) (retention of 50% of all "articles,
implements and material found or discovered"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977) ("fair
compensation to the permittee for underwater historic property recovered"); S.C. ConE §§
54-7-230(a)-(b) (Supp. 1980) ("licensee's equity ... shall not be less than fifty percent artifacts or value of the artifacts recovered"); VA. CoDE § 10-145.9(C) (Supp. 1981) (fair share of
the objects recovered or a reasonable percentage of the cash value); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 6318-25 (1978) ("a fair share of the items recovered"). But cf. S.C. CoDE § 1-20-25 (1974) (all
such "information and objects deriving from state lands shall remain the property of the
state and be utilized for scientific or public educational purposes").
Even professional archeologists have been reluctant to consider shipwrecks and other
underwater materials as archeologically important as land sites. See Cockrell, The Trouble
with Treasure-A Preservationist View of the Controversy, 45 AM. ANTIQUITY 333 (1980).
106. The permit process is frequently available only to those applicants who intend to
further a scientific or educational objective. The Montana statute is typical in its expression
of that public benefit rationale. The legislation authorizes permits to "reputable museums,
universities, colleges or other . . • institutions . . . with a view toward dissemination of
knowledge about cultural properties." MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 81-2505(a) (Supp. 1977).
See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 5302 (1974) (excavation "with a view to increase
knowledge"); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-813a (1975) (permits granted "solely for scientific or public educational purposes"). A specific articulation of that principle is most important because it expresses a policy of reserving archeological exploration solely for the public's benefit and not for personal financial gain.
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logical materials discovered at the site of a permitted exploration
and all records pertaining to the activity are the property of the
state107 and must be transferred to state custody at the conclusion
of the excavation. Assertions of title to artifacts recovered from
archeological sites on state lands have been justified on the theory
that objects buried underground are owned by the titleholder of
the real property. 108 Because the state is the owner of the land, it
also owns articles found buried· in the ground. 109
The permit programs conducted by state governments are focused solely on excavation conducted on state, and sometimes local, government lands. 110 Although state legislation often speaks in
terms of the protection and preservation of sites, that is not the
primary goal. Archeological permit programs represent state supervision of private activities on public lands-a land management
rather than an explicitly preservationist function. One notable
omission from most state statutes is the concept of continuing supervisory responsibility over permitted activities.m Authorized
site exploration should be supervised by competent state personnel
107. See, e.g., ALA. ConE § 41-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.020 (Supp. 1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 8-802 (1976); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-80-401 (1973); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 7, §§
5302, 5304 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12(3) (West 1975); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-7
(1976); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1605 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 374
(1974); Mn. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. § 2-309 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.37 (West 1979);
Miss. ConE ANN. §§ 39-7-9, -11 (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 121-22 (1974); N.D. CENT. ConE §
44-03-02 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 3309(a) (West 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-4
to -5 (1977); S.C. ConE § 54-1-210 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-20-25, -34
(1980); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-6-104 (1980); UTAH ConE ANN. § 63-18-25 (1978); VA. ConE§
10-145.9 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 27.012(5) (West 1973).
108. Colorado's statute and declaration of purpose typifies others, providing:
The state of Colorado reserves to itself title to all historical, prehistorical, and archeological resources in all lands, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and other areas owned by the
state or any of its political subdivisions. Historical, prehistorical, and archeological
resources shall include all deposits, structures, or objects which provide information
pertaining to the historical or prehistorical culture of people within the boundaries of
the state of Colorado, as well as fossils and other remains of animals, plants, insects,
and other objects of natural history within such boundaries.
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-89-401(1) (1973). For a less specific declaration of title, see Mn. NAT.
REs. ConE ANN. § 2-309 (1974).
109. See note 11 supra.
110. Occasionally, state permit programs apply to sites on both state and local government lands. See, e.g., IDAHO ConE § 67-4120 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-540:f to -5404
(1980); Kv. REV. STAT. § 164.720 (1977); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 9, § 27C (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.31(2), .36(2) (West 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-11 (1972).
However, permit programs apply only to lands owned by or under the control of the state.
111. Continuing supervision could only occur if there was sufficient state or federal
funding to support the formation of a group of highly trained officials who would be present
at excavation sites to represent the state's interest.
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to ensure that proper techniques are being employed and that all
discoveries are being reported.
An examination of state law also reveals that permit programs
apply only to governmental lands and do not place legal obligations on the private landowner in the use of his land. 112 Because no
state has claimed ownership or control over artifacts found on private property, an individual may investigate and excavate his land
without any form of governmental intervention; any artifact discovered is considered the property of the landowner. Moreover,
there is no legal prohibition against landowners intentionally destroying artifacts or sites located on their own property, although
many states encourage landowners to comply voluntarily with the
permit requirements applicable to state land, 113 and others create
an affirmative duty to report discovery of an archeological site or
artifact to a state agency. 114 Aside from those limited provisions,
112. For instance, the North Dakota statute requires a state permit "before making
any investigation, exploration, or excavation of any prehistoric or historical [sites] on any
lands in North Dakota." N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-03-01 (1972) (emphasis added). Another
section of the statute, however, specifically declares: "Nothing contained in this chapter
shall be construed to limit or prohibit any person owning land in this state from exploring
or excavating for archeological or paleontological material on his own land or by written
consent to any other person." Id. § 55-03-05. Professor Robert E. Beck, noting the disparate
treatment of public and private lands, has suggested that private landowners could be required to apply for digging permits on their own lands. He adds, however, that the permits
·could not be denied by the state. Beck, North Dakota's Historic Preservation Law, 53 N.D.
L. REv. 177, 190-92 (1976). Although a permit requirement would give the state notice of an
impending excavation, it would not effectively protect sites, and it would probably be ignored by private landowners.
113. The Arkansas statute provides:
It is a declaration and statement of legislative intent that field archeology on privately owned lands should be discouraged except in accordance with both the provisions and spirit of this Act [§§ 8-801 to -808]; and persons having knowledge of the
location of archeological sites are encouraged to communicate such information to the
Arkansas Archeological Survey.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-802 (1976). See also DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 5305 (1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 267.14 (West 1975); GA. CoDE ANN. § 40-813a (1975); MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 2301 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.32 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-10(A) (1980);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 70-1 (1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-29 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 63-18-27 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 27.53.070 (1979).
114. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-10(a) (1976) (90 days notice before any construction,
alteration, disposition or improvement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.1610 (West Supp. 1980)
(90 days notice); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 361 (1974) (no minimum time required, but
notice must be given); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-27 (1978) (immediate notification). The
Hawaii statute is noteworthy because it permits the State Department of Land and Natural
Resources to condemn threatened properties discovered through the statutory notice requirement. See HAWAII REv. STAT.§§ 6E-10(a), (d) (1976).·A similar provision exists in New
Mexico. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 18-6-10(C)(1)-(5) (1978).(permitting condemnation or zoning to preserve site).
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state control over activities adversely affecting archeological
properties located on private property is virtually nonexistent.

C. State Review of Development Projects Affecting Archeological Resources
Archeological properties may be adversely affected by direct
governmental action. Federal statutes have made federal agencies
aware of the impact their actions may have on historical and
archeological resources and, through sensitive project planning,
have required them to avoid unnecessary harmful effects. However,
those federal laws do not reach the myriad of state and local activities that affect cultural properties. Recognizing that state and local
government action can be as damaging to archeological resources
as any federal undertaking, many states have enacted statutes to
regulate and coordinate state and local government actions to, at
best, avoid the loss of archeological sites and artifacts or, at least,
make government planners aware of cultural resource interests at
an early stage of project planning. A number of statutes advise
state agencies and local governments to cooperate with cultural resource oversight agencies. 1115 However, those statutes have relatively little value because they do not impose specific obligations to
notify and consult with cultural resource agencies to minimize the
negative effects of state actions on archeological properties. In at
least one jurisdiction, the state archeological department is directed to inform public agencies of the location of archeological
sites so they can be avoided in project planning.116 That procedure
allows state agencies to voluntarily integrate consideration of
archeological site location into their internal processes and long
115. See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41:1613 (West Supp. 1980); VA. CoDE § 10150.2(B) (1978).
116. As part of a multifaceted system of government regulation, the Alaska statute
requires that "the department [of Natural Resources] shall locate, identify and preserve in
suitable records information regarding historic, prehistoric and archeological sites, locations
and remains. The information shall be submitted to the executive departments of the
state." ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070(a) (1977). North Dakota accomplishes the same result by
stating as a matter of law that "[t]he state, its departments and agencies, each city, county,
school district, and other body politic, are by this chapter notified of the existence of state
historic sites . . . listed in the state historic sites registry." N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-10-08(1)
(Supp. 1979).
Federal law and the law of the State of Washington restrict access to archeological resource site information. See 16 U.S.C. § 470hh (Supp. III 1979); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §
42.17.310(1)(k) (1979). There is justification in limiting access to site location data because
commercially motivated site looters could acquire public information and use it for their
illicit purposes.
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term planning. 117
The vast majority of states that subject agency and local government development decisions to a cultural resource impact review have modeled their procedures, to some extent, after the federal system. 118 That system requires federal agencies undertaking
potentially damaging actions to obtain the comments of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation before proceeding with the
proposed project. 119 Often, the Advisory Council can secure a
memorandum of agreement with the project agency requiring it to
mitigate the adverse effect of its proposed action on cultural
properties. 120 In the state law context, state and local governments
are usually required to notify the state archeologist or historical
preservation agency prior to taking any action that will or may
have an adverse effect on archeological sites. 121 The purpose of the
notice requirement in most jurisdictions is to provide a hiatus during which state archeologists can salvage any significant artifacts. 122 The primary emphasis of those statutes is not to prevent
117. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 44.22(7) (West 1979).
118. The North Carolina statute employs language most similar to that of federal law:
[T]he head of any State agency having a direct or indirect jurisdiction over a pro, posed State or state-assisted undertaking, or the head of any State department,
board, commission, or independent agency having authority to build, construct, operate, license, authorize, assist, or approve any State or state-assisted undertaking,
shall, prior to the approval of any State funds for the undertaking, or prior to any
approval, license, or authorization as the case may be, take into account the effect of

the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is listed in
the National Register of Historic Places ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a) (1974) (emphasis added).
119. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4 (1979).
120. Id. § 800.8.
121. The advance notification obligation is a common feature of fifteen states' archeological statutes. However, the review, investigation and salvage requirement applies to varying numbers of state and local governmental entities. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070 (Supp.
1977) (state, state agency, state licensee); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-803 (1976) (state agencies,
departments, institutions and commissions, counties and municipalities); CAL. PuB. RES.
CoDE § 5097.1 (West 1972) (state agencies); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-8 (1976) (state agencies,
officers, political subdivisions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1977) (state, political subdivisions and instrumentalities); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.40 (West 1979) (state and other government agencies); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-12(a) (1974) (state agencies, departments, boards,
commissions, independent agencies); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08 (Supp. 1979) (state, departments, agencies, cities, counties, school districts, other bodies corporate and political);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1047.1c, .1j (Purdon Supp. 1981) (all public officials); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 42-45.1-7 (1977) (state agencies, departments, institutions, commissions, municipalities); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-22 (1980) (state departments, institutions, agencies,
political subdivisions); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-18-37 (1978) (state agencies); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 767 (1978) (state agencies, departments, commissions, institutions, municipalities);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.22(2)(a), (7) (West 1979) (state agencies).
122. The Rhode Island statute is typical:
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site disturbance but to postpone the state agency's planned activities until objects of interest have been removed. 123
In all but four instances/ 2 ' state cultural resource agencies are
powerless to interfere with the ultimate decision to proceed with a
planned project. Although there may be valid reasons for denying
state archeologists absolute power to veto development proposals
of other governmental entities, in appropriate situations, the decision to preserve a site rather than salvage the artifacts and data
available from the site should be made by an external board or
perhaps by the governor of the state. That type of conflict resolution procedure would enable a state archeological agency to advocate cultural resource preservation within the structure of state
government.
An alternative procedure could be modeled after the specialized administrative committee technique included in the federal
Endangered Species Act/ 211 which established a bifurcated administrative process to resolve governmental development/wildlife conflicts and placed the ultimate decisionmaking authority in a comAll state agencies, departments, institutions, and commissions, as well as all municipalities, shall cooperate fully with the historical preservation commission in the preservation, protection, evacuation, and evaluation of specimens and sites and to that
end:
(a) When any state or municipal agency finds or is made aware by an appropriate
historical or archeological authority that its operation in connection with any state,
state assisted, state licensed, or contracted project, activity, or program adversely affects or may adversely affect scientific, historical, or archeological data, such agency
shall notify the state historical preservation commission and shall provide the commission with appropriate information concerning the project, program or activity.
The provisions of this chapter shall be made known to contractors by the state agencies doing the contracting.
(b) The state historical presevation commission, upon such notification, shall, after reasonable notice to the responsible agency, conduct a field investigation.
(c) The state historical preservation commission shall initiate actions within
thirty (30) days of notification under subsection (a) or within such time as agreed
upon by the parties involved. The responsible agency is authorized to expend agency
funds for the purpose of assisting said commission with such field investigations.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-7 (1977).
123. Those state salvage systems are similar to the program authorized by the federal
Reservoir Salvage Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
·
124. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.070(e) (Supp. 1977) (decision to governor); HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 6E-8(a) (1976) (decision to governor); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2724 (1977) (decision to
governor subject to judicial review); N.D. CENT. ConE § 55-10-08(2) (Supp. 1979) (no review
of state historical board).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III 1979). The Endangered Species Committee, composed
of seven agency heads, id. § 1536(e)(3), is directed to evaluate requests from the Act's protective species policy under specifically articulated standards. Id. § 1536(h)(1). See Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened
Species, 58 N.C. L. REv.,,491, 545-56 (1980).
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mittee composed of agency heads. Development-oriented agencies
would probably be more willing to consult with archeological officials early in project planning if the ultimate decision was made by
an internal board. That system would also encourage agencies to
adopt suggested project design and location modifications to obtain the concurrence of the state archeological agency. A legislative
amendment would be the most appropriate way to establish such a
procedure.

D. Other State Regulatory Provisions
Cultural resource interests are recognized in environmental
policy and impact statement laws, critical areas legislation, mining
and energy facility siting statutes, and local government planning
and land use control authority. Each of those sources of authority
permits state and local governments some control over adverse impacts on archeological and historical properties.
1. State Environmental Policy and Impact Statement Statutes-One of the many accomplishments of NEPA126 was the articulation of a national environmental policy, applicable to federal
government actions. The Act prescribed a decisionmaking process
that requires evaluation of the environmental effects of a federal
activity during the planning stage by means of the environmental
impact statement. 127 Importantly, NEPA expanded the concept of
environmental quality to include cultural resources. 128 Following
the enactment of NEPA in 1969, many states passed environmental protection legislation, often very similar to the federal statute.129 Consequently, state environmental policy statutes often include cultural resources as protected environmental values130 and,
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1976). See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
127. I d. § 4332(2) (c).
128. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
129. At least 15 states have enacted environmental policy statutes similar to NEPA.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1401 to -1416 (1976 & Supp. 1981); CAL. PUB. REs. ConE §§ 2100021176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-1 to -76 (1980); IND. ConE ANN.
§§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (Bums 1981); Mn. NAT. REs. ConE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1974 & Supp.
1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01.13 (West 1977); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -324 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:35A-1 to -14, 13:19-7 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. ENVIR. CoNSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to
-0109 (McKinney Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-1 to -10 (1978); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS
ANN.§§ 34A-9-1 to -13 (1977); VA. CODE§§ 10-17.107-.112 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§
43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (West Supp. 1979). See generally W.
RoDGERS, supra note 53, at 809-22.
130. All the statutes mentioned in note 129 supra, except North Carolina's and Wisconsin's, specifically recognize cultural resource values within t~e environmental quality
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therefore, have potential for providing an additional level of protection for culturally significant properties.
State environmental statutes have assumed two general
forms. 131 The majority of states have followed the pattern of federal law by establishing a state policy requiring an environmental
impact evaluation of governmental action and authorizing interagency consultation and review of proposals.132 Although applicable to a variety of actions, the environmental impact statements
required by most of those statutes include consideration of cultural
resource issues. Moreover, the environmental review requirements
have provided private litigants standing to challenge state
decisionmaking.
A second type of state statute provides declaratory and injunctive relief for environmental damage. 133 Under those statutes, the
concept of environmental quality encompasses cultural properties.
The intent underlying the equitable remedy statutes is to provide
groups and individuals access to the courts to achieve their environmental protection goals. Although compliance with existing
statutes, regulations and ordinances constitutes a defense to the
authorized civil action, it appears that litigants may employ the
environmental quality statutes to restrain both private and public
actions threatening archeological properties. The effectiveness of
those statutes will undoubtedly depend on the willingness of the
courts to view archeological resources as important subjects of
public trust.
2. Critical Areas Legislation-A number of jurisdictions
have recognized the unique qualities of and threats to certain land
within their borders and have enacted laws designed to protect
concept. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1a (1981); N.Y. ENVIR. CoNSERV. LAw § 8-0105(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 10-17.107(a) (1978). Recent cases affirm that statutory
intent. See, e.g., Society for Cal. Archeology v. Butte County, 65 Cal. App. 3d 832, 837, 135
Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1977). But see Hoboken Environment Comm. v. German Seaman's Mission, 161 N.J. Super. 256, 391 A.2d 577 (1978) (limiting environmental values to those relating to the natural environment).
131. A third approach to environmental protection at the state level involves the designation and acquisition of environmentally significant areas. See notes 174-194 infra and
accompanying text. Archeological properties have been included within that protective system. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1403, -1409(b), -1409(f) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
132. See, e.g., MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 75-1-201 (1979).
133. That statutory form originated in Michigan legislation enacted in 1970 to provide
what has been termed an "environmental cause of action." See MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§
691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1981). Early experience under the Michigan act is described in Sax &
Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 7 (1974). Other states have enacted similar
laws. See Note, Minnesota's Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REv. 575 (1972).
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it. 134 Some states have formally designated fragile, 135 critical136 or
natural137 areas as preferred land use categories and have sought to
preserve them through state acquisition programs138 or state land
use regulation. 139 Significantly, those protective state programs
often reach lands having archeological or historical importance and
thus provide additional protection for cultural resource properties.
Such programs, however, may lead to unnecessary duplication of
regulatory requirements and a lack of coordination between state
agencies responsible for cultural resources and those responsible
for other critical areas.
3. Mining and Energy Facility Siting Statutes-States also
have exercised regulatory control over a limited range of privately
sponsored activities with potential for damaging archeological
properties. For instance, the siting of electric generating facilities
is usually supervised and approved through licensing procedures
administered by a state public utilities commission. 140 A number of
state legislatures have set out standards for the regulatory agency
to follow when considering potential plant sites. In at least two jurisdictions, New York141 and California/42 those criteria are employed to minimize adverse environmental effects, including the
impact of siting decisions on archeological or historical resources.143 However, the secondary effects of new energy produc134. Coastal zone management laws provide an example of that approach. See, e.g.,
CAL. PUB. REs. CoDE§§ 30000-31406 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, §§
7001-7013 (1975 & Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.213.10 (West Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -128
(1978 & Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 46-23-1 to -17 (1980 & Supp. 1980); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 90.58.010-.930 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
135. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6551 (Supp. 1980).
136. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 9-19-102(a)(ii) (1977).
137. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-1409(b), (f) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
138. See id; notes 174-194 infra and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 9-19-102(a)(ii) (1977).
140. The state government's power to regulate public utilities is well established. See
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Recently, states have authorized utility commissions to
consider the precise siting of energy generating facilities as part of the licensing process.
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-276 to -276.18 (1979); CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE §§ 25500-25542
(West 1977 & Supp. 1980); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 476A.1-.14 (West Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 164, §§ 69G-69S (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§
140-149 (McKinney Supp. 1980); WASH. REv. CoDE§§ 80.50.010-.902 (1979).
141. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 142 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
142. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25520(g) (West 1977).
143. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAw § 146(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981). The California statute goes even further by specifying that "areas for • • . historic preservation" are not to be
approved as a power plant site unless "such use is not inconsistent with the primary uses of
such lands and ... there will be no substantial adverse environmental effects." CAL. Pus.
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tion will not be determined and are possibly unascertainable at the
licensing stage. Regulatory and nonregulatory protections mentioned elsewhere in this article are therefore necessary to ensure
that remote effects of energy generation will not damage archeological properties.
A second area of state regulation of private enterprises affecting archeological properties is surface or strip mining. Many states
have enacted legislation regulating surface mining within their borders.144 Those statutes were spurred by passage of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977/411 which requires states to have a federally approved surface· mining
regulatory program. 146 The federal law, serving as a model for the
states, prohibits surface mining on public parks and "places included on, or eligible for listing on, the National Register of Historic Places unless approved jointly by the [state mining] regulatory authority and the Federal, State or local agency with
jurisdiction over the park or [historic] places."147 An area of land
also may be designated as unsuitable for surface mining if the operations would "affect fragile or historic lands in which the operations could result in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific, or aesthetic values or natural systems. " 148 Several
states have chosen to closely follow the federal law and regulations
by empowering state surface mining agencies to designate cultur81
resource properties as unsuitable for mining activities. 149 Others
REs. ConE § 25527 (West 1977). The statutory section concludes by adding that "the commission shall give the greater consideration to the need for protecting areas of critical environmental concern, including •.. unique historical, archeological, and cultural sites." Id.
144. See, e.g., Miss. ConE ANN. § 53-7-49 (Cum. Supp. 1980); MoNT. REv. ConES ANN.
§§ 82-4-201 to -254 (1979); N.D. CENT. ConE§ 38-14.1-07 (Supp. 1980); W.VA. ConE§ 20-622 (Supp. 1980); WYo. STAT. § 35-11-406 (1977).
145. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 3, 1977,
Pus. L. No. 95-87, titles I-IX, 91 Stat. 447-531).
146. See id. §§ 1251-1279. The Department of Interior issued final regulations in 1979
specifying the prerequisites for an approvable program. 30 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-890.23 (1980).
Those regulations respond to archeological resource interests in a number of ways. See id. §
776.12(a)(3)(i) (1980) (mining application requires ·a narrative description of listed or eligible properties of the National Register and known archeological resources); id. § 779.24(i)
(permit application requires maps of cultural resource locations); id. § 761.12(f) (transmission of permit application to cultural resource protection agencies for revi~w); id. § 810.2(h)
(permanent program performance standards).
147. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979). See also 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(c) (1980).
148. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1979). See also 30 C.F.R. § 762.11(b)(2)
(1980).
149. Compare W.VA. ConE§ 20-6-22(a)(2) (Supp. 1980) and Miss. ConE ANN.§§ 537-49(1)(a), (e) (Cum. Supp. 1979) with 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1979) and 30
C.F.R. § 762.11(b)(2) (1980).
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have established legislative criteria for denying surface mining permits, specifically recognizing the value of archeological and historical sites. 1110 Through those regulatory provisions and other sections
of state mining law,m archeological properties can be spared the
devastating and disturbing effects of surface mining.m
4. Local Planning and Land Use Control Authority-Some
states have granted local governments specific regulatory power to
protect and preserve historically significant areas. 1113 That authority frequently has been used to enact local landmark and historic
district legislation.
In addition, state legislatures have often required localities to
plan community development. In a number of jurisdictions, that
planning includes requirements that local land use planners consider historical properties in preparation of master or comprehensive plans.m The integration of cultural resource policy into land
150. See Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 53-7-41(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.§
82-4-228(2)(b)(ii) (1979); N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 38-14.1-07(1) (Supp. 1980); W.VA. CoDE§ 206-22(d)(2) (Supp. 1980); WYo. STAT. § 35-ll-406(h)(iv) (1977).
151. Some states have gone beyond the minimum required by the Department of Interior regulations. For instance, Mississippi generally prohibits any surface mining
on lands which are part of a national park, national monument, national historic
landmark, any property listed on the national register of historic places, national forest, national wilderness area, national wildlife refuge, national wild or scenic river,
state park, state wildlife refuge, state forest, recorded state historic landmark, state
historic site, state archeological landmark or city or county park, forest or historical
area.
MISS. CoDE ANN. § 53-7-47 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Montana, on the other hand, recognizes a
policy "to restore, enhance, and preserve its scenic, historic, archeological, scientific, cultural
and recreational sites" within its surface mining law. MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. § 82-4202(1)(d) (1979). The Montana statute also specifically notes that in granting permits for
prospecting, underground mining and strip mining, "particular attention should be paid to
the inadequate preservation previously accorded Plains Indian history and culture." Id. §
82-4-227(2)(d).
152. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act against wide-ranging constitutional attacks. See Hodel v. Indiana, 101
S. Ct. 2376 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352
(1981).
153. The Texas zoning statute includes "protection and preservation of places and
areas of historic and cultural importance and significance" in its statement of permissible
zoning purposes. TEx. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1011a (1953). Other states have delegated similar
regulatory power to general and special purpose governmental units. See HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 6E-15 (1976) (political subdivisions); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66D, § 8-101 (1978) (special park
district); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney 1973) (village law).
154. The New Jersey planning statute provides a useful example. It establishes
mandatory elements of a local master plan, including "[a] community facilities plan element
showing the location and type of educational or cultural facilities, historic sites . . . and
other related facilities, including their relation to the surrounding areas." N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55D-28(b)(6) (West Supp. 1981). The term "historic site" is defined in the statute. See
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use planning systems could avoid archeological site damage caused
by local government construction and development activities. 11515
Moreover, if local planners identified important sites within their
jurisdictions, local governmental units could acquire the property
as a means of protecting significant cultural resources. 1156
General land use planning and control powers are commonly
delegated to local governments through state enabling acts. 1157
Throughout the nation, control of land use type, density and location has been effectuated through the exercise of zoning, subdivision control and building code requirements. Zoning is authorized
as a police power regulation intended to accomplish generally
stated public purposes. 1158 Over time, the police power has been
found to be a legitimate source of authority for an expanding range
of local land use regulation. 1159 The generality of language employed in the state enabling acts makes it conceivable that local
governments could create regulations based on the police power to
preserve archeologically significant sites. 160
As a general principle, highly restrictive local land use controls
have been judicially approved where they have been shown to be
•
rationally related to valid public purposes and not arbitrary or unid. § 40:55D-4. The Hawaii statute grants even broader planning and regulatory power to
local governments. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976).
155. Some states have granted regional agencies the power to review local development projects. It might be advisable to subject such actions to regional review to assess their
impact on cultural resources. A Kentucky statute, originally enacted in 1961, could serve as
a model. See Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 147.610, .650 (Baldwin 1980).
156. See notes 174-194 infra and accompanying text.
157. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§§ 2.19-.29 (2d ed. 1976).
158. For an expansive discussion of the major goals of land use planning and zoning,
see 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW§§ 8.01-15.07 (1974).
159. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (open space protection); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (historic landmark preservation); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (shoreline protection
regulations). See also Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New
General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603, 608-38
(1981).
160. The Hawaii statute grants expansive authority to local governments:
In addition to any power or authority of a political subdivison to regwate by planning
or zoning laws and regulations or by local laws and regulations, the governing body of
any political subdivision may provide by regulations, special conditions, or restrictions for the protection, enhancement, preservation, and use of historic properties.
Such regulations, special conditions, and restrictions may include appropriate and
reasonable control of the use of [sic] appearance of adjacent or associate private property within the public view, or both, historic easements, preventing deterioration by
wilful neglect, permitting the modification of local health and building code provisions and transferring development rights.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976).
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reasonable. 161 Local zoning ordinances and subdivision controls
could be designed so that private construction would not be permitted on lands where archeological sites are located. 162 In areas
having many such sites, a land survey might be required as a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit.163 Further, local ordinances in jurisdictions with state cultural resource agencies could
provide that development projects in areas of known archeological
importance be preceded by a referral to the state body for review.16' Within a reasonable period of time, the agency could take
actions ranging from a literature or site survey to actual salvage of
artifacts. In addition, lands found to possess special archeological
value could be recommended for public acquisition through
purchase or condemnation. Referral to a state agency would accomplish a number of objectives. First, development occurring on
private lands would be subject to an archeological resource impact
review. That requirement would provide one of the few methods
available for regulating development and controlling damaging activities on private land. Second, the issue of archeological resource
protection would necessarily become one of local concern; local
government officials could no longer ignore cultural resources.
Third, cooperation between state cultural resource agencies and local units of government would be encouraged. By establishing that
type of coordinated system, many of the protections provided by
NHPA and state review statutes would be available. 1611
Local governments could also exercise their zoning authority
to place archeological properties in special zoning classifications
that limited the land's use. Land use controls restricting a landowner's right to develop his property have been upheld as valid
police power regulations where they sought to achieve important
social objectives. Examples can be found in controls protecting
161. See Euclid v.. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
162. For over 50 years, many types of subdivision controls have been imposed on residential developers. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 158, §§ 165.01-.09. The subdivision process has been regulated for a number of purposes, including the control of large scale devro 1opment to minimize adverse financial and environmental effects. Subdivision control
ordinances often regulate very specific aspects of residential development. See generally D.
HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 604-10 (2d ed.
1980).
163. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 17.02 (2d ed. 1977); 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra
note 158, § 16.06 (1975).
164. Such a system of referral has been applied to state and local government actions.
See notes 115-125 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 59-68, 115-125 supra and accompanying text.
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wetlands, 166 shorelines, 167 open spaces,168 :floodplains169 and historical properties. 17° Frequently, those limitations have required that
t~e land remain relatively undeveloped. 171 If by statute or judicial
ruling archeological protection was determined to be a legitimate
exercise of the police power, protective zoning regulations could
survive initial constitutional due process challenges.172
166. See, e.g., Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Environmental Protection, 168
Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); Sands
Point Harbor v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (1975); J.M. Mills v. Murphy,
116 R.I. 154, 352 A.2d 661 (1976). The most notable case in the area is Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court validated a highly restrictive county ordinance.
167. See generally, 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 2.09 (2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1980).
168. The United States Supreme Court recently upheld a California municipality's
open space regulations against the claim of an uncompensated taking of property. See Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980). Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated:
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate governmental
goals. The State of California has determined that the development of local open
space plans will discourage the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space
lands to urban uses."... The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the
city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill-effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes have long been recognized as legitimate.
Id. at 261 (citation omitted). However, the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), took a less sympathetic view of local government regulations
attempting to provide public open space.
169. See A.H. Smith Sand & Gravel Co. v. Department of Water Resources, 270 Md.
652, 313 A.2d 820 (1974); Turnpike Realty Co., Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284
N.E.2d 891 (1972); Cappture Realty Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J. Super. 216, 336
A.2d 30 (1975). See also Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the
Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REv. 201 (1974).
170. The primary United States Supreme Court opinion upholding restrictive land use
control regulation for the preservation of historical landmarks is Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). That decision upheld the New York City Landmark
Preservation Law against constitutional attacks. See note 1 supra. There have been a number of state and federal court opinions sustaining such ordinances. See, e.g., City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d
416, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1973); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d
163 (1976); M & N Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 111 ill. App. 2d 444, 250 N.E.2d
289 (1969); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969);
Vieux Carre Property Owners & Assocs., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d
367 (1964); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New
Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato,
198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941); Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265,
316 A.2d 807 (1974); State v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); City of Dallas v.
Crownrich, 506 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
171. The case of Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), provides a vivid example of the scope of the police power. In Just, permitted uses under the
shoreland zoning ordinance were extremely limited. 201 N.W.2d at 765-66 nn.3 & 4.
172. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 157, § 7.03; D. GoDSCHALK, D. BRoWER, L.
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A more serious obstacle to archeological site zoning is the possibility that it would be deemed a "taking" without just compensation.173 It is assumed that, as in floodplain zoning, a landowner who
has an archeological site located on his property would be prohibited from taking any action that would disturb the physical integrity of the site. That classification, if permanent, would effectively
eliminate the development potential of the land. It is not inconceivable that a landowner would regard that form of public regulation as the equivalent of a public acquisition of private land without compensation.
Although courts have been reluctant to find that public land
use regulations constitute an impermissible taking of property,
archeological site zoning would be more appropriate as a temporary "holding device" used to maintain the status quo until the site
had been either professionally surveyed or permanently protected
through governmental or public interest group acquisition. Using
archeological site zoning as a temporary device would avoid a constitutional attack and provide protection for significant archeological sites.

E. Public Acquisition of Archeological Resources
While the regulation of land-disturbing activities may present
an attractive approach to the problem of archeological resource
damage, acquisition methods are also available. Those techniques
often provide benefits unattainable through purely regulatory
methods. First, acquisition of an archeological site by a state or
local government unit or by a nonprofit organization may permanently remove the land from private market development and increase the total amount of land available to the public for educational and recreational activities. Second, acquisition would extend
existing legal protections against unauthorized excavations of land
McBENNE'IT & B. VESTAL, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 43-44 (1979);
Note, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1443-62, 1502 (1978). A
recent Third Circuit opinion addressed the due process issue in the context of restrictive
rezoning. See Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 689-90 (3d Cir. 1980).
173. The essence of the landowner's claim would be that the archeological use classification constituted an excessive regulation of property rights. As Justice Holmes stated in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), "[I]f a regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking." The Court's recent refusal to find a taking in the Penn
Central decision was based on the assumption that the landowner could continue an existing, profitable use of the land. In the archeological context, the preexisting land use might
be as undeveloped rural land and, consequently, the analogy to the Penn Central case would
be imperfect.
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previously beyond the scope of protection provided by state and
federallaw. 174 And third, by employing a policy of land acquisition,
potentially significant sites could be reserved for future examination when new techniques and methods of analysis became available.1711 However, it is worth noting that the public acquisition of
archeological sites, standing alone, does not ensure their preservation. A commitment to the management and surveillance of those
areas is necessary to protect against looting and vandalism. 176 That
obligation is a continuing one and must be considered as an important land management function by the entity acquiring the land.
To understand the different options available for acquiring
property, a number of techniques must be examined.
1. Acquisition by Purchase-State and local governments
and public interest groups can protect archeological sites by obtaining ownership of parcels through direct purchase from the fee
title holders. 177 Other interests, such as preservation restrictions,
could also be purchased. 178 Because, in the direct purchase context,
174. See notes 112-114 supra and accompanying text.
175. New methods of analysis and analytical approaches that will require undisturbed
locations for their application are being developed. A policy that encourages the salvage of
sites rather than their preservation would preclude future examinations that could reveal
important insights into prior societies. See King & Lyneis, Preservation: A Developing Focus of American Archeology, 80 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 873, 882 (1978).
176. Vast tracts of land are owned by the federal government and are under the supervision of federal officials who are armed with significant enforcement powers. See note 86
supra and accompanying text. Yet, the expanse of territory to be covered and the small
number of personnel may make the sanctions provided by federal law less effective than
they could be.
177. Where archeological sites are already owned by the government, the "reservation" power can be used to maintain state or local government control. A number of state
statutes specifically provide that public lands possessing archeological or historical value
will not be sold. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-805 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 133c2
(Smith-Hurd 1967); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 299.52 (Supp. 1981); MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN.
§ 2-3-404 (1979); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 55-03-06 (1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.11 (Purdon Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45.1-8 to -9 (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAws .ANN. §§ 120-27, -28 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-6-108 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 765, 766
(1978). The reservation technique has been incorporated within federal law for nearly a century. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
178. The acquisition of preservation rights or easements rather than fee title interests
provides a potentially less expensive method of protecting archeologically significant properties. In addition, the holding of such an easement does not impose substantial land management responsibilities on the owner. The South Dakota statute provides an example of spe~
cific legislation authorizing local governments to acquire, by a variety of means, "historic
easements." The statute provides:
Any county or municipality may acquire, by purchase, donation or condemnation,
historic easements in any area within their respective jurisdictions wherever and to
the extent that the governing body of the county or municipality determines that the
acquisition will be in the public interest. For the purpose of this section, "historic
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the seller must be willing to convey title, and the buyer must be
able to pay seller's price, voluntary land transactions can present
at least two problems. First, the landowner may not be willing to
sell because he wants to maintain the existing use or hold the
property for later sale at an enhanced price. Second, the landowner
may demand a price the purchaser cannot meet.
A number of states have specifically authorized governmental
units to acquire properties having historical and archeological significance.179 That statutory authorization is often necessary to provide an identifiable delegation of power from the state legislature.
Occasionally, statutory authority for the acquisition of land for
general conservation purposes, such as open space preservation,
also permits the purchase of culturally significant sites.180 Even if
the requisite legislative authority exists for acquiring archeological
properties, most states do not make funding available. 181 Public interest organizations that intend to acquire and preserve such sites
have similar funding problems because their resources, usually
donated by members or benefactors, are quite limited. 182
easement" means any easement, restriction, covenant or condition running with the
land, designated to preserve, maintain or enhance all or part of the existing state of
places of historical, architectural, archaeological or cultural significance.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-16 (1980). See also notes 185-192 infra and accompanying
text.
179. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.09 (West
1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.33 (West 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-9(b) (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5005(a), (c) (Purdon Supp. 1981); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19B12 to -16 (1980); VA. CODE§§ 10-152, -156(c)(3) (1978); WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.08.250 (1979);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.34(3), (3m) (West Supp. 1981); WYo. STAT. § 18-10-105 (1977).
180. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 10-152, 156(c)(3) (1978). Local governments may acquire
funding for the acquisition of cultural resource land under federal open space land legislation, see 42 U.S.C. § 3535(d) (1976), which is administered by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). That program can provide a grant of up to 50% of the
acquisition costs. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 540.1(b), .2(f)(3), .3(a), .4(b)(4) (1980). The administrative regulations also anticipate the acquisition of protective easements and other less-thanfee interests. Id. § 540.6. Complex selection criteria are also provided in the form of HUD
regulations. I d. §§ 541.1-.20. Note, however, that during fiscal year 1981, the federal acquisition program was not funded.
181. Some states have established funds to acquire property interests in cultural
properties. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 253.4000-.407 (Supp. 1981) (Historic Preservation Revolving Fund Act); N.Y. PARKS & REc. LAW§§ 17.01-.11 (McKinney 1979) (Outdoor Recreation
Development Bond Act); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5001 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (Open Space
Lands Act).
182. Although the problem of obtaining sufficient acquisition funds is of major concern, there are some public and private preservation groups that have combined financial
resources to purchase archeological sites. The Archeological Conservancy, a private organization, and the Ohio Historical Society, a quasi-public group, have recently joined forces to
acquire the 120-acre site of the Hopewell Mound Group near Chillicothe, Ohio. That acquisition was intended to protect a major ceremonial site from the threat of urban sprawl. See
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2. Acquisition by Condemnation-For a number of reasons,
such as an inadequate offering price or development expectations,
the present titleholder of an archeological site may not wish to sell.
Consequently, eminent domain powers may be used as an alternative means of acquiring the land. 183 A number of states have
granted specific power to state agencies and subordinate governmental units to condemn culturally significant properties.184 It is
likely that delegations of general condemnation authority also
could be used to support public "takings" of archeological sites.
Although authority for the condemnation of archeological sites
is available, 185 there are a number of considerations that make
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 19, 1980, at 6B, cols. 5-6.
183. Condemnation of land or interests in land for the purpose of protecting cultural
resources has long qualified as a permissible exercise of eminent domain powers. The United
States Supreme Court has twice ruled that such a condemnation of private property constitutes a valid public purpose within the traditional constitutional bounds of eminent domain.
See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. See also 2A J.S. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.519 (3d ed. 1980). State courts have reached the same result. See Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 194 Md. 275, 71 A.2d 12 (1950); In re Application of Dept. of Archives & History, 246 N.C. 392, 98 S.E.2d 487 (1957).
184. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1977) (state agencies acquiring historical,
prehistoric or archeological properties in danger); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 6E-3(2) (1976) (state
agency acquiring historical cultural properties); MINN. STAT. § 138.09 (1980) (counties acquiring archeological sites); NEB. REV. STAT. § 82-120 (1976) (state historical society to acquire historical properties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:60-25.53 (West 1967) (municipalities acquiring historical sites); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121.9(b), (g) (1981) (state agency acquiring
properties of historical, architectural, archeological or other cultural importance); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5005(a), (c), 5008 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (state agency and counties acquiring
historical sites); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.§ 1-19B-16 (1980) (county or municipality acquiring historical easements); VA. CoDE § 10-145.1 (1978) (state attorney general); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61.34(3), (3m) (West Supp. 1981) (village acquiring historical places).
At least one state, Mississippi, has specifically denied counties and municipalities the
power to use condemnation authority to acquire "historic preservation properties." Miss.
CoDE ANN. § 39-13-9 (Cum. Supp. 1980). A recent review of Mississippi law concluded that
the "[d]enial of the eminent domain power would be a serious hindrance to the preservative
cause but for an earlier statutory provision authorizing county boards of supervisors to acquire historic sites by gift or grant." Comment, Historic Preservation and the Zoning
Power: A Mississippi Perspective, 50 Miss. L.J. 533, 561 (1979). The author apparently did
not consider the possibility of an unwilling grantor. The Virginia state courts have narrowly
construed the eminent domain power to make it exercisable only by the state attorney general. See Virginia Historic Landmarks Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 568, 230
S.E.2d 449 (1976).
185. The Alaska statute anticipates one situation where the exercise of condemnation
authority may be crucial. If the Alaska Department of Natural Resources finds that an historical, prehistoric or archeological property is in danger of being sold or used so that its
cultural value will be destroyed or seriously impaired, the state agency may acquire the
property by eminent domain. See ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1977). That provision for
emergency use of the condemnation power is valuable, although its usefulness would depend
on prompt notification of impending site damage.
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other acquisition methods preferable in most circumstances. First,
taking of property by eminent domain requires compliance with a
detailed condemnation procedure, which is often the subject of judicial review. Local government officials may not wish to risk the
financial and political cost of an extended struggle for acquisition
of property for cultural resource preservation. Second, the condemnor must compensate the landowner for the property rights
that are taken. That presents the same problem encountered in the
voluntary acquisition context-a lack of funding. Third, a local
government could face political opposition to a decision for either
the expenditure of public funds or the exercise of eminent domain
power in acquiring and protecting archeological sites. Fourth, the
acquisition of an archeological site by condemnation would require
a continuing management responsibility, which a local governmental unit might not wish to assume. Fifth, local governments' separate purchases or condemnations could result in the misallocation
of scarce acquisition funds. Finally, such a decentralized system
would not ensure that the most significant archeological sites, determined on the basis of state or regional priority, would be
acquired.
3. Protective Restrictions-Because the acquisition of fee interests in lands possessing special environmental or cultural value
may be impractical, a large number of state legislatures have provided for restrictive land use agreements, which can be useful in
protecting those valuable interests. 186 Protective restrictions per186. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1979) (perservation restriction);
CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (Supp. 1978) (conservation easement); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 47-42a to -42c (1978) (conservation restriction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West
1981) (conservation easement); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (1978 & Supp. 1980)
(conservation easement); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 6E-15 (1976) (historic easements); IDAHO
CooE § 67-4613 (1980) (historic easements); !LL. ANN. STAT. cb. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1A(2), (5)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); id. ch. 30, §§ 401-406 (conservation rights); IND. CoDE ANN. §§
14-4-5.5-1 to -4 (Burns 1981) (conservation easement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1252 (West
Supp. 1980) (preservation restriction); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 66B, § 8.04 (1978) (architectural
easements); Mo. REAL PRoP. CoDE ANN. § 2-118 (1974 & Supp. 1980) (conservation easement);' MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) (conservation,
preservation and agricultural restrictions); MicH. CoMP, LAWS ANN. § 554.706 (Supp. 1981)
(open space easement); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 67.870-.955 (1978) (open space); MoNT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§ 76-6-101 to -211 (1976) (conservation easements); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
77:45-:47 (Supp. 1979) (conservation and preservation restriction); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8B1 to B-9 (West Supp. 1981) (conservation and historic preservation restriction); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 121-34 to -43 (1981) (conservation and historic preservation agreements); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 271.710-.750 (1979) (conservation or scenic easements); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§
11941-11947 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (open space covenants); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5
(Supp. 1980) (conservation and preservation restrictions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-
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mit landowners to transfer specifically defined development rights
to their land. By conveying away a preservation restriction, the
present landowner agrees to subject his property to limitations
that can preserve an existing use, in theory protecting the cultural
resource located on the land. Protective restrictions are similar to
the traditional restrictive covenant or equitable servitude.187 To
avoid technical limitations inherent in the traditional real property
devices, state legislation authorizing protective agreements often
specifies that the restrictions are binding against successive owners
of the land and are enforceable by transferees of the initial
grantee. 188
Some landowners may willingly transfer protective easements
without any additional incentive other than the thought that the
present condition of their lands will be preserved. However, economic incentives exist to further encourage the donation of restrictive covenants to public bodies or nonprofit organizations. Making
a gift of a preservation right to such entities can qualify as a tax
deductible charitable contribution for federal income tax purposes.189 The Internal Revenue Code was amended in 1977 to recognize charitable gifts of real property easements "granted in
19B-16 (1980) (historic easements); TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 64-9-101 to -103 (Supp. 1980)
(preservation easement); id. §§ 11-15-101 to -108 (1980) (protective easements); UTAH CoDE
ANN. §§ 63-lSa-1 to -6 (1978) (preservation easement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 10-821 to 823 (Supp. 1980) (conservation and preservation rights and interests); VA. CoDE § 10-142
(1978) (restrictions); WAsH. REv. CoDE§ 64.04.130 (1979) (preservation easements); W.VA.
CoDE § 8-26A-4 (1976) (historic restriction).
187. See generally A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON PROPERTY 1024-78 (2d
ed. 1969).
188. The Rhode Island statute concerning "conservation restrictions" specifically addresses those issues:
No conservation restriction held by any governmental body or by a charitable
corporation, association, trust or other entity whose purposes include conservation of
land or water areas or of a particular such area, and no preservation restriction held
by any governmental body or by a charitable corporation, association, trust or other
entity whose purposes include preservation of structures or sites of historical significance or of a particular such structure or site, shall be [unenforceable] against any
owner of the restricted land or structure on account of lack of privity of estate or

contract, or lack of benefit to particular land, or on account of the benefit being
assignable or being assigned to any other governmental body or to any entity with
like purposes, or on account of any other doctrine of property law which might
cause the termination of such a restriction.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-39-3 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
189. The federal income tax laws have provided significant economic incentives in the
form of rapid amortization and accelerated depreciation to aid in the preservation of historic buildings. See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, TAX INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 7-54 (G. Andrews ed. 1980); Day, Federal Income Tax Reform: An Important Tool for Historic Preservation, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 315, 329-36 (1980).
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perpetuity . . . exclusively for conservation purposes. mso The economic importance of that federal income tax provision depends on
the value assigned to the donated easement: the greater the restriction, the larger the charitable contribution.191 In the context of
archeological properties, the precise valuation of the transferred
restriction· will be determined by the value of alternative land uses
that are no longer permissible. That allows a larger deduction
where the donated preservation restriction eliminates use of the
land for more lucrative activities.
In addition to the federal income tax deduction for donation
of a preservation restriction, state laws frequently offer the inducement of reduced real estate taxes. 192 On the theory that the owner
of the fee simple estate has conveyed away part of his interest in
the land, state statutes direct that the remaining restricted property be taxed at a reduced value. That lower appraisal is derived
from an estimate of fair market value of the land encumbered by
the preservation restriction. By transferring the preservation restriction to a governmental entity or nonprofit organization, the
landowner is taxed for the limited use permitted rather than the
highest and best use of the land.193 The real estate tax reduction
190. I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii).
191. The Internal Revenue Code generally limits the maximum amount of charitable
contribution deductions to 50% of the taxpayer's "contribution base for the taxable year."
Id. § 170(b). The deduction of an extremely large contribution can be carried forward up to
five years. Id. § 170(d).
192. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 29.53.025(b)(2)(C), (e) (Supp. 1980) (possible total exemption of burdened land from real estate taxes); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-139.01-.03 (1980),
-277(B)(8) (Supp. 1981) (possible 15-year valuation at eight percent of full cash value to
owners of land with recognized historical value); CAL. REv. & TAX ConE§§ 421-430.5 (West
1970 & Supp. 1981) (valuation of restricted open space); id. §§ 439-439.4 (West Supp. 1981)
(valuation of restricted historical property); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 39-1-104(5) (Supp. 1980)
(state historical register status will not add to valuation); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-131b, 12127a (1972) (open space land valuation and possible municipal tax abatement for historical
structures); GA. ConE ANN. §§ 85-1407, -1409 (1978 & Supp. 1980) (valuation of land encumbered by facade or conservation easements); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-48.2-6 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981) (valuation reduced by restrictions); Mn. ANN. ConE art. 81, § 12E (1980) (tax
credit for open space lands); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 361A.050, .170-.250 (1979) (open space use
assessments); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-40 (1981) (land encumbered by conservation and preservation agreement assessed at encumbered value); Omo REv. ConE ANN. § 5709.18 (Page
1980) (total value tax exemption for prehistoric sites); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 308.740-.790 (1979)
(open space land assessment); TENN. ConE ANN. § 11-15-105 (1980) (assessment at encumbered value of land subject to scenic easements); VA. ConE § 10-155 (1978) (assessments of
land subject to restrictions); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. §§ 84.34.010-.922 (Supp. 1980) (current
use assessment).
193. The ability to reduce local land taxes by the donation of preservation restrictions
to tax exempt organizations or the state government provides the landowner an economic
benefit, but it may be unattractive to the local taxing jurisdiction, which would lose tax
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derived from that approach could be substantial, resulting in the
continuation of existing land uses that did not disturb cultural resource sites.
If considered in combination with the associated economic incentives, preservation restrictions are powerful tools for protecting
culturally important lands. However, in the context of archeologically significant properties, preservation restrictions must be carefully drafted to clarify the range of permissible activities allowed
the landowner. Also, the holders of those restrictions must conscientiously inspect the burdened parcels at regular intervals to ensure that the agreements have not been breached. Because the idea
of specialized nonpossessory land use restrictions has spread rapidly throughout the nation, it is likely that they will provide an
inexpensive, nonregulatory method for protecting socially significant lands. 194

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Most states have recognized the existence of archeological resources by statute and have attempted to protect them through
regulatory and nonregulatory policies. However, it is unusual to
find a comprehensive and integrated approach in any single jurisdiction. Although several methods are available to protect archeological sites, few states have adopted them all as a unified system.
Because state and local governments have the potential for significant action in the area of archeological resource protection, it is
suggested that an analysis be undertaken of the sufficiency of local
law in each state. Such an analysis would require an understanding
revenues. If the recipient of the restriction was a tax exempt entity, the value of the reduction embodied by the agreement would escape local taxation because the new owner of the
interest would be tax exempt. That factor could make local governments and other taxing
authorities reluctant to have state preservation restriction laws that eroded their tax base.
194. The expanding state law in this field makes it possible for landowners to donate
or sell preservation rights in their land and may have a major impact on future protection of
cultural properties. Public and private entities now will be able to own nonpossessory interests that can be judicially enforced. For example, Connecticut law specifically states:
[C]onservation and preservation restrictions are interests in land and may be acquired by any governmental body or any charitable corporation or trust which has
the power to acquire interests in land in the same manner as it may acquire other
interests in land. Such restrictions may be enforced by injunction or proceedings in
equity.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-42 (1981).
The private landowner will retain possession and existing use of the property, but will
have ceded the right to modify the land use to one that could damage or destroy the protected interest.
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of the essential components of a comprehensive state program for
the protection of archeological sites.
1. States should have a cultural resource agency that is
staffed by fully trained individuals and is adequately funded. The
state cultural resource .agency could be charged with a wide range
of responsibilities, including the discovery and identification of
archeologically important sites, intergovernmental review and comment on state agency actions, expeditious acquisition of title or
preservation rights to immediately imperiled sites, active solicitation of donations of culturally significant properties, provisions for
expert advice and technical assistance to local governments, and
education of the general public to the value of cultural resources.
Counties or regional organizations could be integrated into statewide systems to locate, acquire and preserve archeological sites.
2. State legislatures should express a clear policy favoring
the preservation of archeological resources located on private as
well as public land. Those policy statements should be applicable
to all governmental action and should affirm the principle that intentional or accidental site damage must be avoided. Significant
cultural sites should be presumptively ineligible for public construction projects, and destructive use of those sites should be limited to extraordinary situations where no reasonable or prudent alternative exists. The legislative policy statements also should
require compliance by state and local government agencies and
those requirements should be enforceable in suits by private
citizens.
3. A system of intergovernmental review should be established to evaluate the effect of state agencies' development proposals on cultural resources. Many development projects are
funded, licensed or otherwise assisted by the federal government
and consequently come under the review provisions of NEPA and
the NHP A. However, a large number of other potentially damaging
activities are undertaken solely by subfederal governmental units
and therefore escape the coverage of federal law. State activities
should be evaulated by an independent commission or cultural resource agency, which could advise the project agency of possible
adverse effects on archeological sites and suggest ways of mitigating the impact. To avoid lengthy delays, the review procedure
should be limited in duration, and inaction should create a presumption of approval. In cases of serious and immediate threats to
extremely significant cultural properties, the review commission
should be empowered to stop the development agency's project for
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a period of time to enable it to appeal directly to the governor. In
addition, public intervention could be employed to allow for the
submission of written comments, public hearings or citizen suit
proceedings. Over time, such a review procedure, coupled with a
legislative policy statement favoring the preservation of archeological sites, could alter state agency project planning practices.
Although state activities may be subject to some form of cultural resource or environmental review, local governments' actions
are often free of external evaluation. It would be advisable to subject some of those local activities to review by statewide or regional
cultural resource organizations. State legislative policy also should
direct local governments to plan their construction projects to
avoid, where possible, the use of archeological properties. Known
or suspected archeological sites might also be exempted from public use without special review and analysis. In addition to regulating their own development activities, local governments should be
encouraged to protect known or discovered archeological sites by
direct acquisition or through cooperation with preservation organizations. The enactment of local regulatory ordinances protecting
those sites would supplement existing state authority.
State legislatures should appropriate funds for the purchase or
condemnation of significant sites that are in danger of being damaged by private activities. The acquisition of full fee interests or
restrictive agreements should be authorized. Cooperative procedures should be established between privately funded preservation
organizations and state funded cultural resource agencies to ensure
that limited private funds will be used to protect the most seriously imperiled sites. In an era of severe government budget restrictions, that public/private collaboration should include joint efforts aimed at securing additional financial support from ·
charitable foundations and other contributors for archeological site
acquisition.
Legislative action could enhance a protective acquisition policy by encouraging the sale and acquisition of protective restrictions or covenants. The formal recognition of those severable rights
would facilitate private donations of enforceable land restrictions
without cost to the state or preservation organization. Without a
clear interpretation of state law establishing the existence and enforceability of preservation rights, landowners might be reluctant
to make such donations.
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CONCLUSION

The federal government has taken two primary approaches to
the problem of cultural resource protection: acquisition and regulation. The limitations of that structure are apparent. Financial constraints allow only limited acquisition of historically or archeologically significant sites. Furthermore, federal authority to require
advance expert review of potentially destructive activities extends
only to actions undertaken by federal agencies, their licensees or
grantees. In addition, the federal archeological site excavation permit process reaches only federally owned or controlled land. Therefore, the federal legislative policy standing alone cannot control the
full range of activities that threaten archeological sites and artifacts. A significant role exists for state and local governments to
assist the federal government in protecting irreplaceable cultural
resources.
Ultimately, the question of state action will be determined on
the basis of the priority accorded cultural resource protection by
state and local officials and administrators. States can create a policy favoring cultural resource protection, but such a policy must be
supported by numerous government officials having only peripheral contact with historical and archeological resources. It is of
prime importance that state and local officers be made aware of
the significance of archeological sites and artifacts and then foster
a preservationist philosophy. That direction must inevitably come
from the legislature and must take the form of specific programs
and protective legal standards.
Failure to protect archeological resources in a comprehensive
fashion will mean that future generations of Americans will lose
irreplaceable knowledge about prior societies and about their cultural heritage. Unless a clear policy of preserving significant archeological sites is established, the destruction of sites and artifacts by
public and private land development and by acts of vandalism and
pillage will persist. We possess the means to avoid that destruction
through coordinated intergovernmental action. That opportunity
will not exist forever; to allow it to pass would be unpardonable.

